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S T A T E , S O C IE T Y  A N D  P O LIT IC A L  C O N FLIC T IN B ALI, 1945-1946
Geoffrey Robinson
Th is  once so peaceful island is now bowed down by a terror of revolu­
tionary youths, principally in the kingdoms of Tabanan and Badung, 
which threatens to cause a total dislocation of the so w ell-ordered 
Balinese social system. . . .  So long as this evil is not combatted, normal 
government administration on Bali cannot be expected.1
There is a conspicuous gap, both analytical and historical, in the scholarly 
study of modern Bali. The missing years are 1945 to 1966, and the unuttered theme 
is political conflict. It is probably no coincidence that the lost decades of Balinese 
history were also the most openly "political" and the most violent in this, or perhaps 
any, century. Th is  article is a modest response to the provocative silence. It is 
the story of political conflict in Bali between August 1945 and March 1946; a tim e 
of intense political activity and violence after the defeat of the Japanese, and prior 
to the return of Dutch K N IL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands 
Indies A rm y) troops.2 Th is  period of slightly more than six months constitutes a
critical juncture in Bali’s social and political history. During these few months the 
terms of Balinese political discourse were fundamentally and irrevocably changed,
mass political and m ilitary mobilization occurred on an unprecedented scale, and
new political and social conflicts emerged while old rivalries became more visible 
and often more acute. From late 1945 through 1948 political conflict on Bali was 
chronic and frequently violent. W ith the exception of one large-scale battle, in which 
96 died in one day, all of the casualties fell in close guerrilla combat, in ones and 
twos, some stabbed, others beheaded or burned in their houses, the lucky ones
1. Report from the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sanders, early April 1946. S. L. Van 
der W al (with P. J . Drooglever and M. J . B. Schouten), ed., Officiate Bescheiden 
Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945— 1950, 12 vols. (hereafter 
Officiate Bescheiden) (Th e  Hague: Nijhoff, 1972-1984) 4 (Docum ent No. 33), p. 84. 
The  term pemoeda (pemuda) is literally the Indonesian word for youth or young 
person. It is used here, however, in a stricter, political/sociological sense to describe 
the revolutionary younger generation of Indonesians, who played a central political 
and m ilitary role in the period of the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 and after. 
For a more complete appreciation of the concept of pemuda, see B. R. O ’G. Anderson, 
Java in a Tim e o f Revolution, Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), especially ch. 2, pp. 16 -34 .
2. Recent contributions to the regional history of the Indonesian Revolution make 
comparison an inviting prospect. See, for instance, Audrey Kahin, ed., Regional 
Dynam ics o f the Indonesian Revolution (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1985). 
I have chosen, however, to focus exclusively on the case of Bali, prim arily because 
we do not yet have a single history in the English language of the island during 
this period. The  only relatively complete study o f the Revolution in Bali, to my 
knowledge, is Nyoman S. Pendit’s Bali Berjuang (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979), 
originally published in 1954.
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2shot. Moreover, after December 1945, the fighting took place prim arily in the villages 
and the rural parts of Bali. There were no forward lines of combat, no safe areas 
nor impenetrable mountain sanctuaries. It was a war in which nobody could choose 
to remain neutral.3
When the Dutch returned on March 2, 1946, Bali was in a state of turm oil, and 
the lines of social and political division had been drawn. Dutch m ilitary and political 
strategists discovered that they had been sorely mistaken in their assumption that 
the Balinese had no interest in politics and would welcome the restoration of Dutch 
authority.4 Although some 2,000 K N IL troops managed to land at Sanur beach and 
Benoa without firing a single shot, within one week they were facing a fierce guerrilla 
resistance.5 A  secret (Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service) overview of the week 
March 2 2 -29 , 1946, reported that "everywhere anarchy prevails and terror is taking 
on serious proportions."6 There were, however, significant variations in the extent 
and degree of political conflict and resistance. The  base areas of resistance, and 
the major centers of open political conflict were within the kingdoms of Tabanan,
3. Nyoman Mantik, a Balinese pemuda leader who spent the Revolution in Java and 
Bali as a liaison officer, claims that the fighting in Bali was more intense than 
that in Java. (Interview: I Nyoman Mantik, A pril 5, 1986.) Dutch officers who took 
part in the occupation of Bali and who later served in Java and Sumatra described 
the fighting in Bali as "much worse than in Java,” "severe and intensive guerrilla 
com bat," and "far worse than expected." (Interviews: form er officers of the K N IL 
Bali/Lombok Brigade, May 1987.)
4. Dutch m ilitary and political reports from  late 1945 and early 1946 consistently 
predicted that resistance to a Dutch reoccupation of Bali would be minimal or nonexis­
tent. A  report from  December 1945, for instance, claimed that ” . . .  if a landing 
of Netherlands troops within a very short period would take place, the Balinese 
people and its chiefs would collaborate with the Netherlands." See "Data About Bali 
From Schlager," December 8, 1945, Algemeen Secretarie Batavia le  Zending (hereafter 
A S -1 ), XXII/19, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The  Hague (hereafter A R A ), Inv. No. 2.10.14. 
A  m ilitary document noted: "N o resistance expected at and after landings. . . . Cooper­
ation of Balinese is certain." In "Situation as of December 3, 1945," A S — l/XXII/19, 
A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.14.
5. In the first few months after the Dutch return to Bali (March 2, 1946), several 
hundred Balinese were killed by K N IL troops and their Balinese auxiliaries, and 
thousands were taken as "prisoners of w ar." O ver the course of the Revolution 
(1945-1949), roughly 1,400 Balinese died on the Republican side alone, and a further 
700 died fighting on the side of the Dutch. See the list in Pendit, Bali Berjuang, 
pp. 368-90, for his figure of 1,371 deaths on the Republican side. Th e  figure of 
700 Balinese is my own estimate of those who died fighting on the side of the 
Dutch or their allies, and those who were the unrecorded (unknown) victim s of terror 
from both sides, and is based on the weekly and monthly casualty statistics from 
Dutch m ilitary and political reports. The  relevant archives are: 1) "Overzicht en 
Ontwikkeling van de Toestand Troepenco Bali/Lombok" (hereafter 0 0 7 ) in "R a p - 
portage Indonesie" (hereafter R l), Nos 740-41 (A R A ), Inv. No. 2.10.29; 2) "Wekelijksch 
(M ilitaire) Inlichtingenrapport" (hereafter W IR), in R l No. 737, A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.29; 
3) "Politiek Verslag" (title varies), in A S -1 , A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.14. Additional copies 
of the m onthly 0 0 7 s  and the weekly WIRs for Bali/Lombok are held by the Ministerie 
van Defensie Archieven Depot [hereafter M vD) in Th e  Hague, Inv. 32/1, G G -5 , 1407.
6. "Geheim Militaire Overzicht— N EFIS," No. 5, March 2 2 -2 8 , 1946, in R l No. 151, 
AR A, Inv. No. 2.10.29.
Balinese pemuda fighters in Buleleng. At left, I Negah 
Wiita Tamu (CiBk), a former Peta section commander, 
active in various struggle organizations until the 
final surrender in January 1950. (From Njoman S. 
Pendit, ed., Album Bali Berdjuang (Denpasar: Jajasan 
Kebaktian Pedjuang Daerah Bali, 1954].)
■Anti-Pemberontak* (AP), based in Sangsit, Buleleng, 
one of many local militia working closely with the 
Dutch (KNIL) forces in Bali. Here, some AP members 
armed with spears are gathered round a Dutch Piper- 
Cub aircraft, used for reconnaissance, propaganda, 
and occasional armed attacks. Photograph from 
Douwes Dekker Collection, Dept of Manuscripts 
and University Archives, Corned University libraries.
4Badung, and Buleleng.7 (See Map A .) Jembrana was an early center of Republicanism 
in 1945, but it did not remain a base area for long. The four kingdoms in the eastern 
part of the island— Bangli, Karangasem, Kkingkung, and Gianyar— were not areas 
of widespread Republican sympathy. The latter two were, in fact, notoriously p ro - 
Dutch, while the former were more divided. Even within the base areas of Republican
resistance, there were significant numbers of Balinese prepared to cooperate, politically 
and militarily, with the arriving Dutch forces.
It simply made no sense, therefore, when the Dutch spoke of "the Balinese"
as a single entity, because the people of Bali were already acutely divided, and on 
both sides of the issue they were prepared to fight. The six months prior to the
return of the Dutch, then, also suggest some of the reasons why "the Revolution^ 
was experienced as a war among Balinese and not directly as a fight between "the
Balinese" and "the Dutch.” If the "Revolution," in Bali, is understood as a local 
civil war rather than a regional manifestation of a national war of liberation, the 
conflictual politics of the Sukarno era and especially the bloodletting of 1965-1966 
make a good deal more sense.8
But how had a society with a reputation for order and harmony fallen, by March
1946, into a condition of chao6 and political conflict? What had moved the ostensibly
apolitical and peaceable Balinese to become involved in violent "terrorist” pemuda 
organizations? Why did the strength of the resistance vary as it did within Bali, 
and in particular why was open political conflict concentrated in the kingdoms of
Tabanan, Badung, and Buleleng? The general thrust of the argument made here is 
that open political conflict and widespread resistance occurred where there obtained 
both a particular configuration of social forces and economic relations and a collapse 
or sudden weakening of state authority. The variation in social/economic formations 
within Bali— in particular, in the structure of the rivalry between the different
noble houses (pun), the nature of caste relations and social mobility, economic 
relations, and the political legacy of the Japanese period— strongly influenced both 
the geographical and the social distribution of conflict in 1945-1946 and thereafter.
Political conflict was not merely a playing out of perceived social or economic 
injustices, however, but the consequence of struggles to establish or to dominate
state structures at the regional (Bali) and local (kingdom) level. Thus, for example,
the initial concentration of violence in Tabanan and Badung, and the apparent peace­
fulness or stability of Kkingkung and Karangasem, were the result not simply of
the somewhat different socioeconomic conditions prevailing in these regions— though
it was partly that— but also of the differing capacities of the local state in each 
place to exert its authority in preventing or controlling such conflict.9
7. The Indonesian term is kerajaan which is most easily translated as kingdom or 
principality. Depending on their current administrative status under the Dutch, the 
rulers of the kerajaan were known as Raja, "Stedehouder," "Regent," "Bestuurder," 
and "zelfbestuurder," but also by their royal titles such as Cokorda, Dewa Agung, 
and Anak Agung. The term Raja is preferred here.
8. Estimates of the numbers killed in Bali after the coup of October 1, 1965, range
from a low figure of 30,000 to a high of over 100,000. Given that the population
in Bali at the time was roughly 1.5 million, both of these figures represent quite 
extraordinary losses. The strength of the PKJ (Indonesian Communist Party) and 
the severity of the backlash in Bali have never been a secret, but to my knowledge
there has not been a single serious study of the events of 1965-1966 there.
D. Anderson makes a similar argument for the case of Java in 1945-1946. (Anderson, 
Java m a Turn o f Revolution, pp. 138-66 and 332—69.) It is interesting that a similar
5The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. Th e  first o f these 
explains briefly what I mean when I use the term s "state" and "state structures," 
and outlines, theoretically, that part of the argument concerned with the character 
of states. Th e  next section examines the social and economic forces which influenced 
the pattern of political conflict and violence between August 1945 and March 1946. 
It pays special attention to variations within Bali, with a view to understanding 
the geographical distribution of resistance and violence. The  third section examines 
the character of the various state structures affecting Bali during the same period. 
It begins with a brief description of the role of the "national" states, British, Dutch, 
Japanese, and Indonesian. T h is  is followed by a more detailed characterization of 
the "regional" Japanese and Republican states in Bali, which emphasizes their funda­
mental weakness, in spite of Japanese m ilitary might. Finally, a brief comparison is 
offered of two kingdoms in Bali— Tabanan and Klungkung— in order to shed greater 
light on the impact of local states on patterns of political conflict and resistance.
What Are "States" and "State Structures"?
For the argument I am making, it is important to clarify what is meant here 
by the term s "state" and "state structures." The latter are understood as the bodies, 
institutions, and organs through which a particular class or group exercises four 
prim ary tasks of domination v is -S — vis a given population: a) political ordering and 
administration; b) economic surplus extraction and circulation; c) coercive control; 
and d) judicial/ideological hegemony. "State structures" include legislative and executive 
bodies, fiscal and monetary institutions, m ilitary and police forces, bureaucratic 
institutions, judicial systems, and frequently, religious bodies. Taken together, then, 
these are the structures which make up the entities we usually call states.
The term "state structures" is used here prim arily because it suggests the plurality, 
or the internal heterogeneity of states. It therefore avoids the implication that 
there is an essential unity about a state, either in its capacity to "act," or in its 
"character" ("capitalist" states, are in some respects also "feudal"; "bureaucratic" 
states are often partly "patrim onial" etc). Th is  does not mean that we must dispense 
with the term "state" altogether, but sim ply that we are able to distinguish between 
the whole entity (the state) and its component parts (state structures).
That having been said, it must be recognized that more than one "state” may 
exist within a given territory; for example within a single nation-state. The  existence 
of discrete but overlapping levels and types of state— like authority, is most evident 
during periods of political transformation or confrontation. Yet even in tim es of 
peace and stability such overlapping authorities are not unusual.10 These are not
period of chaos and conflict had accompanied the collapse of the Dutch state in 
Bali in 1942, at the time of the Japanese takeover. A t that tim e, however, the Japanese 
were able to establish control with relative swiftness, bringing the violence to a 
halt within a month. In 1945-1946, on the other hand, neither the Japanese nor 
the Republican elements of the regional (Bali) state had the capacity, nor perhaps 
the will, to control the rising political turm oil— boycotts, m urder, kidnapping, burning, 
looting, etc.
10. W ars of independence or secession, for example, are conflicts between at least 
two rival claimants to state authority over a territory and population, and they 
frequently entail the co— existence of two fairly complete sets o f state structures. 
In tim es of peace, challengers at the center may try either to seize control of 
the old state apparatus, or they may attempt to establish independent state structures, 
including m ilitia, judicial structures, systems of taxation, ideological norms etc. In
6sim ply different levels in a single state hierarchy— though in some cases they may 
be this— but derive or draw their authority (ideological, coercive, economic etc) 
from different sources, or else have substantial autonomy from  a higher or more 
central state.
Both of these aspects of states— the coexistence of various levels and types 
of state authority, and the internal heterogeneity or "dividedness" o f states— are 
useful in understanding the pattern of political conflict in Bali in 1945-1946, and 
thereafter. As a start, it is possible to identify at least three levels of state authority 
which affected political relations in Bali at this tim e: 1) the "national" level struc­
tures, centered on Java, including those of the British, Dutch, Indonesian Republican, 
and Japanese governments; 2) the "reg ion al"-leve l states centered in Bali, including 
those of the Japanese, the Balinese Republicans, and after March 1946, the Dutch; 3) 
the loca l-level states centered in each of the eight kingdoms of Bali.
The collapse or weakening of the higher, or more extensive, states effectively 
increased the political centrality of those at lower levels, and resulted in a devolution 
of political authority at least to the level of the eight kingdoms. T h is  devolution 
had three principal effects on political relations there. First, it created a political 
opening for rival state elites; the older Republicans and nationalists in the KNI 
(Kom ite Nasional Indonesia), and also the younger activist pemuda, who quickly 
founded local branches of nationalist youth organizations such as Pesindo, PRI, 
BPRI (Badan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia), B K R /TK R , and ISSM .11 Second, it meant 
that there was greater potential for political conflict to develop among the eight 
kingdoms, due to the absence of a powerful B a li-w id e  state authority. Th ird , it 
meant that, for the first tim e in several decades, the actual political authority of 
the various kingdoms became the determining factor in the maintenance o f political 
order within their respective territories. W ith the surrender of the Japanese, vast 
differences in the strength of the eight kingdoms became immediately apparent. 
The weakness of state authority in Tabanan and Badung, for example, provided 
early opportunities and impetus for the expression of a variety of existing social 
and political conflicts, for the emergence of new political leaders, and for the develop­
ment of new political ideologies and styles. W here the local (kingdom ) state remained 
strong, as in Klungkung and Gianyar, these opportunities were lim ited, and political 
m obilization, if it occurred at all, was at the behest o f a landed aristocracy.
peripheral areas of a country, political challengers/elites more often attempt the 
latter; that is, to set up alternative state structures. T h is  describes fairly, for example, 
the emergence of highly autonomous feudal lords in frontier regions, and the growth 
of rebel bands and millenarian movements, such as the Hoa Hao of Cochinchina, 
the Saminists o f Central Java, and Saya San in Burma. (See W . Brustein St M. Levi, 
"Rulers, Rebels and Regions 1500-1700." Paper presented to the Meeting of the Am eri­
can Sociology Association, Detroit, M l, 1983; E. J . Hobsbawm, Sociaf Bandits and 
Prim itive Rebels {Glencoe, Illinois: The  Free Press, 1959); and Hoa Hue Tam  Ta i, 
"Dream s of Peace and Plenty: Vietnamese Millenarianism and its Modern Fate" {manu­
script, 1981)).
11. The  Bali branch of Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) was founded November 13, 
1945; PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia) on November 13, 1945; BKR (Badan Keamanan 
Rakyat) on August 31, 1945; T K R  (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) on November 1, 1945; 
ISSM (Ikatan Siswa Sekolah Menengah) in September 1945.
7Social and Economic Forces— The Sources o f Conflict
The social and economic bases of conflict in Bali are too numerous and complex 
to be treated satisfactorily in an article. W hat is offered here, therefore, is only 
a broad outline o f the main sources of conflict in 1945— 1946. For convenience these 
can be grouped as follows:
(a) Rivalries between noble houses ("p u ri");
(b) Issues of caste;
(c) Relations of production— economic issues;
(d ) The Japanese legacy— m ilitary, political.
Although in some respects the character of Bali was remarkably homogeneous, 
internal variation was of considerable importance in determining the incidence and 
pattern of political conflict there. Differing socioeconomic conditions affected the 
kinds of issues which were to become politically salient in each area. They also 
influenced the type of political alliances which were likely or feasible, and the 
store of political options and resources (organizational, ideological, m ilitary, economic) 
which were available for political mobilization.
(a) Puri Politics
Among the most important sources of conflict in 1945-1946 were the historical 
rivalries which existed among Bali’s noble houses, or "puri.*12 These rivalries centered 
on matters of social status, control of land and labor, and access to political or 
adm inistrative and religious office, especially the offices of Raja, Punggawa (D istrict 
Head), and Sedahan Agung (Chief Irrigation and Tax O fficer).13 In a strict sense,
12. The  term s "puri" and "jero" describe an extended household of Satria caste 
with a genealogical claim to high (noble) status. In theory, relative status is based 
upon a principle of proxim ity to a core or royal lineage. The  houses of those most 
closely related to a "reigning" Raja may legitimately be referred to as "puri gde," 
while those more distantly related are designated, in declining order, as "puri," 
"jero gde," and "jero ." (See Clifford Geertz, Negara, The Theatre State in Nineteenth 
Century Bali [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 2 6 -3 4 ; also see Clifford 
Geertz and Hildred Geertz, Kinship in Bali [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1975), ch. 4, pp. 117— 52.) In practice, however, there is a more or less continuous 
debate over status claims. (See Geertz, Negara, p. 60; also Clifford Geertz, Peddlers 
and Princes [Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1963], p. 24.) Indeed, in 
precolonial Bali, rebellions and revolts were often led by challenging puri; for example 
in Gianyar in the 1880s. (See I Wayan Dunia, "Pemberontakan Cokorda Oka Negara 
di Giangyar Tahun 1884-1890," Skripsi, Universitas Udayana [U N U D ], 1984.)
13. W ith the imposition, after 1906, of a territorially based system of political author­
ity, and a rapid expansion of private ownership in land, control over people and 
control over land became enmeshed, and differences in landed wealth became an 
increasingly important aspect of political and social power. Control of formal political 
office became sim ilarly im portant. One consequence was that the focus of puri rivalry 
and factionalism expanded to encompass not sim ply the claims to status and deference, 
which Geertz argues were central in late nineteenth century Bali, but also control 
over political office, land, and labor. Th e  major political offices, as they were under­
stood in the 1940s, were Raja, Punggawa, o f which there were several in each kingdom, 
and Sedahan Agung. In addition to these posts, there were others which were coveted 
including: Manca— an assistant District Head; Sedahan— Tax and Irrigation Officer 
for an entire watershed; Judge on the Raad van Kerta— the Judicial Council for
8these rivalries often had little to do with the issues of nationalism or Indonesian 
independence, but in the period after August 1945, they came increasingly to be
framed in the idiom of this debate. The political mobilization which occurred at
this time, in the name of merdeka (freedom, independence), and (all-Indonesia) Repub­
licanism on the one hand, and "Balinese autonomy" (from Java) and "Loyalism" (to
the Dutch) op the other, accentuated the conflict not simply between the noble
houses, but also between their respective followers. New and often intense social,
political, and ideological conflicts, were forged in the course of this mobilization.
In some places, such as Tabanan, the ideological question (Republicanism vs. 
Loyalism) was already an important basis of conflict prior to 1945, largely because
of the prewar development of a nationalist movement there. In the 1930s, Tabanan
had the largest and most active branch of the moderate nationalist party, Parindra,
and a large number of affiliated organizations, including the Rukun Tani (rural
marketing and savings coops). Private schools with a nationalist orientation, such
as the Taman Siswa, also received an enthusiastic reception here and in Denpasar, 
and developed rapidly in the prewar period.14 What happened in Tabanan in the
late 1930s, occurred also in other parts of Bali over the course of the Revolution
as the ideological debate over nationalism became a real political issue, and not
simply a guise for other struggles.
The political landscape was complicated somewhat by the fact that Bali had 
been colonized piecemeal by the Dutch.15 Although after 1938 the eight kingdoms
of Bali all had the status of self—governing territories, each headed by a descendant
of the old hereditary rulers, five had experienced reasonably long periods of "direct
rule" under the Dutch, while three had, with minor interruption, remained as areas
of "indirect rule." In the former category, the kingdoms of Buleleng and Jembrana 
succumbed to Dutch military force in 1849, and were brought under direct colonial
rule by 1882. Badung, Tabanan, and Klungkung resisted Dutch penetration in the
first decade of this century, but became direct-ruled territories between -1906 and
1908.16 In these kingdoms, where the Dutch embarked on a strategy of "rationalizing"
political and administrative structures, the surviving members of the Raja—puri (the
noble houses of the various Raja) lost (temporarily) their royal status, and in most 
cases their landed wealth. Leading members were exiled for a time to Lombok, or
were given low-level government jobs as clerks, foremen, or police assistants. In
1929, in recognition of the political failure of the rationalization plan, the descendants 
of the former Raja were permitted by the Dutch to assume their old royal titles,
those in exile were invited to return and were officially designated as "Bestuurders"
Native Law (adat) in each kingdom. For a description of these offices in precolonial 
Bali, see Geertz, Negara, pp. 63-67.
14. Parindra-Bali was originally founded by the Javanese medical doctor, Murjani,
who came to Bali in the mid— 1930s. The first branches were established in Jembrana, 
where Murjani lived, and then in Singaraja, Denpasar, and Tabanan. (Pendit, Bali
Berjuang, pp. 7 -14 .)
15. The following summary is based on Dr. V. E. Korn, Het Adatrecht van Bali
(The Hague: Naeff, 1932), pp. 112-13, 309, 315, 317; and W. F. van der Kaaden, 
"Geschiedenis van de Bestuurs—voering over Bali en Lombok van 1898-1938," Tropisch 
Nederland 11 (1938-1939): 203-8, 219-24, 234-40, 253-56, 265-72.
16. In Badung, the Raja and several hundreds of his followers died in the now
famous puputan (a heroic last stand cum mass suicide) of 1906. In the same year,
the kingdom of Tabanan fell to the Dutch, and shortly thereafter the Raja and
his son took their own lives. The Raja of Klungkung was killed leading a puputan
in 1908, in the face of insuperable Dutch militaiy might.
9(Rulers) within their form er kingdoms, now called "Negara.117 In 1938, in a more 
comprehensive Dutch move toward decentralization, they were officially restored 
to their former status as "Zelfbestuurders" (Autonom ous Rulers) or Raja, with a 
measure of real authority within their respective "Landschappen" (Realm s).17 8
In these form erly d irect-ru led  territories, however, the R a ja -p u ri often lacked 
their earlier material means and royal legitimacy. T h is  was especially true of the 
royal families of Buleleng and Jem brana, where the memory of royal authority had 
seriously faded. It was also very much the case in Tabanan and Badung. Th e  exception 
to the rule was Klungkung, where the R a ja -p u ri was able to reestablish its authority, 
wealth, and prestige with the assistance of the colonial government. The weakening 
of the royal tradition in the western kingdoms left the R a ja -p u ri more vulnerable 
to challenges in the period 1945— 1946, but, with the possible exception of Tabanan, 
it did not send them into the protective arms of the Dutch in 1946.
Three of Bali's Raja— Bangli, Karangasem, and Gianyar— elected for a variety 
of reasons not to resist Dutch incursions at the turn of the century. Instead, they 
recognized Dutch sovereignty and were in return designated as "Stedehouders" (Repre­
sentatives of the Dutch colonial governm ent), and after 1913, as "Regent" within 
their kingdoms. These indirectly ruled territories, or "Gouvernem ents Landschappen," 
were established in Karangasem in 1896, Gianyar in 1901, and in Bangli in 1909. 
Although Bangli and Gianyar officially became "d ire c t-ru le d " areas in 1917, the 
role and the position of their Raja remained substantially unchanged.19 Moreover, 
the R a ja -p u ri were permitted to retain their landed wealth, and fam ily members 
continued to occupy high political offices. Th us with the "restoration" of 1938, 
the royal tradition in these kingdoms remained strong.20 It must be stressed, however, 
that the paramount position of the R a ja -p u ri in these areas had always depended 
to a great extent on the backing of the colonial state, and this was reflected in 
the general willingness of the Raja of the eastern kingdoms to cooperate with the 
arriving Dutch forces in 1946.
Although under the Dutch and Japanese regimes, certain noble houses maintained 
their paramount positions in their kingdoms, other houses, many o f them independently 
wealthy and socially influential, did whatever possible to challenge the incumbents’ 
positions. Changes under the Dutch and Japanese were uncommon, because both 
regimes tended to follow a purely hereditary-based system for filling high political 
offices. But the collapse of state power, in 1945-1946, provided a unique opportunity 
for competing houses to act upon their claims and overthrow an incumbent who had 
been dependent upon the colonial state.21 Where there was no higher authority to
17. Th e  relevant legislation is "Stbl. 1929 No. 226."
18. Th e  relevant legislation is "Stbl. 1938 No. 529."
19. Th e  relevant legislation for the changes in Bangli and Giangyar is "Stbl. 1916 
No. 162" and "Stbl. 1917 No. 518." Beginning in 1921, Karangasem was nominally 
governed by the "Karangasemraad" which was an experiment in decentralization. It 
left the Raja (still called the "Stedehouder") with a certain amount of autonomy 
within his kingdom. "Stbl. 1921 No. 758."
20. In Giangyar and Bangli, for example, the men who were named as "Zelfbestuurders" 
in 1938, had been serving as "Regent" since 1913.
21. It is commonly said in Bali that the Revolution was an opportune time to "m em — 
ba/as" or get back at one’s rivals or enemies. (Interview: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 
16, 1986.) The  Raja o f Giangyar, and later Prim e M inister of N IT  (Negara Indonesia 
T im ur, East Indonesia State), Anak Agung Gde Agung, portrays the revolutionary
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guarantee the right of a lord or puri to political title, power became a matter of 
evident control over a population and/or territory and Republican organizations 
became valuable political allies. Th e  challengers for the position of Raja were some­
tim es economically more powerful, and socially more influential than the incumbents, 
constituting, in effect, a rising landed elite. Th e  collapse of the old state structure 
was the precondition for their political rise, and for the concomitant decline of 
the old aristocracy.
Puri rivalries existed on some scale in virtually every kingdom, district, and 
village on the island. Some of the larger and more important struggles, particularly 
those involving R a ja -p u ri, are worth noting here, because these rivalries strongly 
influenced the character o f political conflict in each o f the eight kingdoms. Tw o 
of these kingdoms, Bangli and Karangasem, will not be discussed, due to a lack of 
reliable inform ation.22
Badung: Th e  major rivalry in Badung was between the Puri Pemecutan and the 
Puri Satria, both located in Denpasar. Whereas these puri had shared power (as 
co -regents) in precolonial Badung, the Dutch had selected the patriarch of Puri 
Satria (then known as Puri Denpasar), to  become "Bestuurder" in 1929, and then 
in 1938 had restored him to the position of Raja or Zelfbestuurder of Badung. Th e  
post of Punggawa Kota23 had for a time been filled by members of the Puri Pemecutan, 
but they still resented their exclusion from  the top office of Raja.24 In the period 
prior to the Dutch landing in early 1946 there was no substantial puri-based opposition 
to the Republican movement in Denpasar but Badung was nonetheless divided politically 
on the basis of allegiance to different puri. After four years of Japanese rule, the 
Puri Satria still held power, but it was economically weak and lacked influence in 
large areas of the kingdom. Because two of the Raja’s sons were involved in the 
KNI and the B K R /TK R , the Raja was unwilling to take any firm  action against the
period in Bali as "a time of intrigue and calum ny." (Interview: Anak Agung Gde 
Agung, May 18, 1987.) These descriptions resonate rather strongly with Geertz’ 
description of politics in late nineteenth century Bali. (Geertz, Negara, p. 62.)
22. The  most important rivalries in these kingdoms appear to  have been within or 
very close to the puri. There seems to have been some unpleasantness in Bangli, 
for instance, between the immediate fam ily members of the Raja, and those of his 
brother, A . A . Gede Agung Anom Putera, after the latter was passed over for the 
position of Regent in 1934. Anak Agung Gde Muditha and Anak Agung Gede Ngurah, 
the sons of Anom Putera, and therefore also nephews of the Raja o f Bangli, were 
two of the most prominent and respected pemuda leaders in Bali. Dutch sources 
speculate that the young men joined the resistance out of a sense of the injustice 
done to their father, but that they were still close enough to the Raja to be guaran­
teed considerable freedom of action. (See R. J . F. Post, "Nopens Zelfbestuurder 
Bangli," December 29, 1947, Archive— Resident Boon/47.) Tw o  of the sons of the 
Puri in Karangasem were responsible for the organization of the B K R /TK R  in the 
kingdom. However, in A pril, with the assistance of the Dutch, the Raja Karangasem 
set up an anti— Republican m ilitia, AIM  (Anti Indonesia Merdeka). (Pendit, Baii Berjuang, 
p. 80. Interviews: I Made W ijakusuma, March 22, 23, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October 
10, 1986.)
23. Kota means town. In each kingdom, the capital was designated as a separate 
district, and was administered by a "Punggawa Kota." T h is  almost invariably led to  
political rivalries between the Raja and the Punggawa Kota.
24. Interview: I Gusti Bagus Oka (form er Sekretaris Paruman Agung Bali 1946-1949), 
December 19, 1986.
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Republican movement.25 6 Members of the wealthier and more influential Puri Pemecutan 
(commanding a strong base of loyalty in Denpasar and the western part of the 
kingdom) had also been active in nationalist circles since the early 1930s.26 In an 
effort to win the allegiance of the stronger Puri Pemecutan, and simultaneously 
undercut the nationalist resistance in Badung as a whole, the Dutch dismissed the 
existing Raja (from  Puri Satria) in m id-1946 and bestowed the title on the patriarch 
of Puri Pemecutan.27 T h is  move succeeded in weakening the Republican movement 
considerably, and it also ensured that the division between the two puri continued 
through the Revolution and beyond.28
Buleleng; In Buleleng, it was rivalry between the R a ja -p u ri (Puri Agung Buleleng) 
and the Puri Sukasada which had dominated the political scene at least since the
25. The  sons involved in the resistance were Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda 
Bagus Agung. The  Dutch saw the Puri Satria as a center of subversive activity in 
South Bali: " . . .  een van de belangrijkste kernen van subversieve activiteit in Z u id -
Bali, in de poeri van deze zelfbestuurder was gevestigd," Secret report on Badung,
by Secretary of State for Home Affairs, H. van der W al, December 15, 1948, Rl,
No. 737/12, A R A  Inv. No. 2.10.29. Some Balinese say that the Raja himself, though
old and infirm , was an ardent Republican, and did not regret relinquishing the post 
in 1946. (Interview: I Made W ijakusuma (PRI founder and leader, e x -H e a d  M B U - 
D P R I-S u nda  Kecil 1946-1948], March 23, 1986.) Wijakusuma also suggested that the 
old Raja’s Republicanism was based in his desire for revenge for the defeat of 1906, 
in which his father, the then Raja, and hundreds of fam ily and followers of the 
puri, died.
26. Together with five others, including two Javanese, one Ambonese, and Nyoman
Pegeg, the head of the Puri Pemecutan (I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pemecutan) formed the 
"Studi Club Ganesha" in the early 1930s to discuss the works o f Hatta and Sukarno. 
When these works were banned, and the club outlawed in 1933, the members struck 
on the idea of establishing a Tam an Siswa School in Bali. (Interview: Nyoman Pegeg, 
Ju ly 31, 1986.) in the early revolutionary period, the leaders of the PRI and the
T K R  (W ijakusuma and Ngurah Rai respectively) reportedly consulted with the Cokorda 
on matters of political and m ilitary strategy. On one occasion the Cokorda met
with twelve balian (men and women with magical/spiritual power) to discuss their
possible support for the Republican resistance. (Interview: I Made W ijakusuma, March 
22, 1986.)
27. See "O verzicht Politiek Situatie," May 1946, in Archive— Resident Boon/46. (T h is
refers to a collection of papers of the Resident Bali/Lombok, D r. M. Boon, made 
available to me by a Dutch scholar who had received them from  the Boon fam ily. 
A t some point they will be available in the A R A . "46" refers to the year of the 
document.) The  old Raja of Badung was eased out of his post in A pril 1946. For a 
full discussion of the rationale behind the Dutch decision, see the secret report
on the situation in Badung, December 15, 1948, in Rl, No. 737, A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.29.
28. It is sometimes said that the Puri Pemecutan betrayed the Revolution after 
accepting the position of Raja in 1946. Others point out that the head of the puri 
(Cokorda Pemecutan) consulted with the main Republican leader, I Gusti Ngurah 
Rai, prior to accepting the position, because he feared that this move might under­
mine the resistance. According to this version of events, Ngurah Rai encouraged 
the Cokorda to accept the job so that he might help the resistance "from  w ithin." 
(Interviews: Nyoman Pegeg, Ju ly  31, 1986; I Made W ijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Anak 
Agung Kecor, September 6, 1987.)
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imposition of indirect Dutch colonial authority in 1849.29 A s a result of the unwilling­
ness of the Puri Sukasada to acquiesce in Dutch authority, several of its leading 
members were sent into exile. The Dutch acknowledged the Puri Agung Buleleng 
as the R a ja -p u ri until 1882 when direct rule was imposed, and then again after 
the nominal restoration of 1929. After a period of exile, the Puri Sukasada became 
the main supplier of Punggawa Kota and in 1945 was still voicing its claim to the 
throne of all Buleleng. Mr. I Gusti Ktut Puja, whom the Republic appointed Governor 
of Sunda Kecil in August 1945, was from  the Puri Sukasada, and many other prominent 
nationalists also had close relations with the puri.30 The  Puri Agung was not unsympa­
thetic to the Republic, but the new Raja (Anak Agung Nyoman Panji Tisna, appointed 
1944) was more inclined to favor peaceful, parliamentary methods than most of 
the pemuda would have liked. For a variety of reasons— not the least of which 
being that he had converted to Christianity— Panji Tisna resigned as Raja in 1947, 
and was replaced by his brother, Mr. Djelantik.31
Gianyar: The Puri Agung Gianyar had a number of challengers for the status 
of Raja— p u ri32 These were concentrated in the western border region of the kingdom, 
and included the leading puri of Ubud, Mas, Pliatan, Pejeng, and Sukawati. Members 
and followers of these puri were strong initial supporters of the Republic, and many 
joined the PRI and the BKR to fight against the militia of the Raja of Gianyar,
29. The man designated by the Dutch as the Raja at this time was apparently the 
former Patih. The Puri Sukasada claims that theirs is the lineage of the actual 
Raja at the time of the Dutch attack and victory, in 1848— 1849. A  Dutch report 
from 1945 acknowledged that the two puri had "an equal claim to the throne." "Nota 
Herbezetting Bali," November 1945, Archive— Resident Boon/45.
30. A  Dutch report from November 1945 noted that the "influential" Puri Sukasada
had a good number of strong and w ell-educated members apart from Mr. Puja. By 
comparison, among the male offspring of the Puri Agung there were "in fact no 
powerful, w ell-educated personalities." Th e  influence of the Puri Sukasada extended 
well beyond Buleleng. (Ibid., p. 1.) It is said that the Puri Sukasada frequently married 
women from Banjar Jawa in Singaraja. Banjar Jawa was later known as a center
of Republican resistance and a focal point of nationalist consciousness in Buleleng. 
(Interview: I Gde Rahjasa |ex— pemuda leader, Buleleng), October 9, 1986.)
31. According to some accounts, Panji Tisna resigned because he could not reconcile
his sym pathy for the nationalist cause with his desire to do an honest job as Raja,
which included maintaining peace and order. Others suggest that he "lacked moral 
courage," "had no convictions," or that he was at heart an artist and writer, and 
not a politician or leader. Some ex-pem uda  claim that he was not sympathetic to 
the Republic at all, but was actually p ro -D u tc h . (Interviews: I Gusti Bagus Oka,
December, 1986; Pak Item (I Ketut W ijana, form er pemuda leader, Buleleng), September 
29, 1986; Anak Agung Santosa, (son of A . A . Nyoman Panji Tisna], October 11, 1986.)
32. For some idea of the history of these challenges, see H. J . E. F. Schwartz, 
"Aanteekening Om trent Het Landschap Giangjar," Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlands 
Bestuur 19, 3 (1900): 166-89. Th e  Puri Giangyar had lost credibility in the eyes of 
many when it surrendered to the Dutch without a fight in 1900. Th e  Raja at that 
tim e requested the status of "Stedehouder," which had been bestowed by the Dutch 
on the form er Raja of Karangasem in 1896 and, in exchange, recognized the full sover­
eignty of the Dutch in his kingdom. Many also regarded the Puri Agung as an "upstart 
puri" because it was said to have been established by a commoner from Badung. 
(interview: Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986.)
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the PPM.33 Yet divided amongst themselves, they were unable to unseat the Puri 
Agung during the Revolution, and the rivalry persisted after independence.34
Jem brana: Tw o  principal houses of the kingdom, Jero Pasekan and Puri Agung 
Negara, had been competing for the position of R a ja -p u ri for the better part of a 
century, but the Dutch favored the la tter35 Nonetheless, the Raja and his son (Anak 
Agung Bagus Suteja, later Governor of Bali), had nationalist sympathies, and their 
puri formed the core of early KNI and pemuda organizations in the kingdom. Nearly 
half of the nationalist activists contacted by the Javanese Republican * propagandist" 
Soekardani in October 1945, were fam ily members, or employees of the Puri Agung.36 
Open armed resistance, though strong at the outset, did not last long in Jembrana, 
particularly after the Dutch arrested the Raja’s son, Suteja. Jero Pasekan, the house 
of the Punggawa Kota, was a center of anti— Republicanism, and with the help of 
the Dutch, it set up the anti— Republican militia, BPP (Badan Pemberantas Pengacau—  
Body of Fighters against Terrorists).37
Klungkung: The  Puri Agung Klungkung had very few serious royal competitors
33. PPN (Pemuda Pembela Negara— Youth for the Defense of the State/Kingdom ). 
The PPN, established by the Raja in late 1945, was dubbed "Pemuda Pembela N IC A" 
(Youth for the Defense of N IC A ), by Republican pemuda. On September 20, 1945, 
the Raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung, was kidnapped by pemuda gangs in 
the vicinity of Tegalalang between Giangyar and Denpasar. Through the intervention 
of the BKR leader, Nyoman Pegeg, he was released. A  few days later, however, 
another attempt was made near Batubulan. Th is  tim e he managed to escape in his 
car, returning prom ptly to Giangyar where he began planning the formation of the 
PPN. The  kidnapping attempts were apparently initiated by the puri of Ubud and 
Pliatan, and possibly others, and were carried out by members of the PRI. Some 
of the older nationalists (like Nyoman Pegeg) regarded the kidnapping as "politically 
very stupid." And one pemuda activist (Dewa Made Dhana), who met with the A . 
A . Gde Agung prior to the incident, recalls that in early September the Puri Giangyar 
seemed prepared to go along with the Republic. A . A . Gde Agung himself claims 
that this act of "terrorism " turned him against the resistance. (Interviews: Anak 
Agung Gde Agung, May 18, 1987; Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986; Bapak Reti, 
Ju ly 30, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October 10, 1986.)
34. In the 1950s the Puri Agung Giangyar (in particular, A . A . Gde Agung) became 
a powerful center of PSI strength, while many followers of the rival western puri 
favored the PNI and the PKI.
35. Th is  summary is drawn from  the collected archives and writings of the Jembrana 
historian, I Wayan Reken (deceased), and from I Ketut Wartama, "Sedjarah Perkem— 
bangan Djem brana," Skripsi U NU D , 1972.
36. O f a list of Balinese Republican activists contacted by Soekardani, over half 
(20 persons out of 37) were from  Negara (kingdom of Jem brana). O f these, nine 
persons were clearly connected with the Puri Agung; seven were fam ily members 
and two were employees in the office of the Raja. ("L ijs t van Personen, waarmede 
de propagandist Soekardani in aanraking is gekomen," A .S .-1 /X X II/1 9 , A R A  Inv. 
No. 2.10.14.)
37. Th e  head of this house was W estra Utama, who seems to have been the driving 
force behind the anti-Republican movement in Jem brana. Th e  BPP was known to 
Republicans as the "Badan Penjilat Pantat Belanda" (Body of A ss -lic k e rs  of the 
Dutch).
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by 1945.38 The Raja’s main local rivals were the Punggawa Kota (I Poetoe Gde 
Pengoejoengan), who was not a triwangsa (of the three highest castes), and the 
Sedahan Agung (I Wajan Merdana), also of low caste, and as a native of Bangli, a 
"foreigner." These men lacked the social, pofitical, and material base necessary to 
challenge the position of the Raja, yet both attempted to do so under the banner 
of Republicanism, and both, together with two others, were murdered by the Raja’s 
militia (BKN) in March 1946.39 The Raja construed Republicanism as "outside aggres­
sion" from Kktngkung’s ok) rivals, Badung and Bangli and from Islamic Java. These 
claims were made more credible by the fact that bellicose armed pemuda and BKR 
groups from Badung did come to Kiungkung in September and October 1945 to mobilize 
the local population.40 Offended and threatened by the actions and demands of 
the pemuda groups, the Dewa Agung took an early stand against the Republic.
Tabanan: In Tabanan a large number of wealthy and influential puri and jero 
with strong Republican sympathies were in a position to challenge the poverty-stricken 
and politically weak Raja-puri, Puri Gde Tabanan.41 The 1945-1946 pattern of rivalry 
apparently did not parallel the major factional split of the turn of the century 
b&ween the allies of Puri Gde and those of Puri Kaleran.42 The rivalry in Tabanan,
38. The Dewa Agung had some limited trouble with his own family, when one of his
sons, Cokorda Anom, joined the pemuda without his father’s permission. On discov­
ering this the Dewa Agung told the Controleur that he was prepared to resign as
Raja. At the same meeting, Cokorda Anom, deeply embarrassed, begged the forgive­
ness of both his father and the Controleur. In Kiungkung only one high—caste house­
hold, the Griya Pidada (Griya =  Brahmana household) was an active source of Republi­
can resistance to the Dutch, but it failed to mobilize the kind of mass following 
necessary for a serious political challenge. Its head, Ida Bagus Pidada, was in fact 
more active in Denpasar politics, becoming a member of the KNI in 1945. For a 
more detailed treatment of the Raja of Kiungkung, see below pp. 43—47.
39. The BKN (Badan Keamanan Negara) was set up by the Raja of Kiungkung in 
November 1945 to combat the rising tide of Republicanism in his kingdom. (Pendit, 
Bali Berjuang, p. 80.) The Raja himself claims that it was set up in January 1946.
The responsibility of the BKN for these murders and other acts of "terror," are 
confirmed by Dutch intelligence reports. See, for example, "De Gebeurtenissen in
Kloengkoeng op Maart 4, 1946," Archive— Resident Boon/48.
40. Pendit, Bah Berjuang, pp. 78-79. Pemuda leaders admit that the actions of the
BKR and PRI who descended upon Kiungkung in August and September were provoca­
tive and "too hot-headed." The Dewa Agung was the only Raja who categorically
refused to fly the Republican flag over government offices and the puri in late 
1945. According to one account he justified his refusal by reference to his collection 
of alontar,t which he said indicated that the day was inauspicious. (Interview: Dewa 
Made Dhana, October 10, 1986.) For the Dewa Agung’s own interpretation of events 
up to March 1946, see his letter/report to the Resident of Bali/Lombok, December 
6, 1948, Archive— Resident Boon/48.
41. The situation in which the Raja of Tabanan found himself is described in more 
detail below, pp. 43-47. See also A . A. W. A. EUerbeck, "Personalia— Tabanan," 
Archive— Resident Boon/46 and van Beuge, "Report on Situation in Tabanan," MvD, 
Inv. No. 32/1-G G .8-D , p. 1.
42. Geertz describes the factionalism in Tabanan, around 1906, in some detail. On 
one side were the Puri Gde, Dangin, Denpasar, Taman, Oka, Anom, Anyar, and the 
Jero Subamia, and on the other were the Puri Kaleran and Kediri and the Jero 
Gde Beng, Kompiang and Tegeh. (Geertz, Negara, pp. 60-61.)
D o 4 ►
MAP 8 TABANAN - POLITICAL SYMPATHIES OF MAJOR PURI AND PUNGGAWA, 1945
Based on information in Ellerbeck, "Personalia.*
17
in effect, was not between the Raja-puri and one major challenger (as was the 
case in most other kingdoms), nor between "the kingdom” and "the outsiders” (as 
the Raja construed it in Klungkung) but among several influential and wealthy puri 
and jero— of which Tabanan had an unusually large number— dotted about the kingdom. 
The vast majority of these puri had Republican sympathies, and this meant that 
the resistance movement soon spread beyond the town of Tabanan. (See Table A  
and Map B.)
Table A
Major Puri and Jero in Tabanan and Their Political Orientation, 1946
Location Puri Name Politics
Tabanan (Kota) Puri Gde Loyal (Dutch)
Puri Kaleran (unknown)
Puri Anom Republican
Puri Anyar Loyal (Dutch)
Puri Kompiang Loyal (Dutch)
Jero Beng Republican
Jero Subamiya Republican
Krambitan Puri Pemecutan Republican
Puri Anyar (unknown]
Puri Gde Republican
Kediri Puri Kediri Republican
Kaba-Kaba Puri Kaba-Kaba Republican
Marga/Blayu Puri Marga/Blayu Republican
Jegu Puri Jegu Republican
Sam -Sam Puri Dewa—Dewa Republican
Source: Compiled from A  W. A  A. Ellerbeck, "Personalia,” Archive— Resident 
Boon/46.
Moreover, in addition to the noble houses, there were a number of wealthy 'commoner” 
houses with substantial landed possessions and considerable political power. The 
weak Raja—puri was forced to flow with the tide, neither leading nor resisting the 
Republican mobilization. The Raja’s 'passivity” provided his challengers, and the 
pemuda, with a great deal of political room for maneuver.
* **
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It is tempting to argue that the Republican banner was taken up by political 
challengers or climbers (especially by the n o n -R a ja -p u ri). T h is  appears to have been 
the case in Badung (Puri Pemecutan), in Gianyar (the puri o f Ubud, Mas, Pliatan, 
Pejeng, and Sukawati), in Klungkung (the Punggawa Kota), and in Buleleng (Puri 
Sukasada). On the other hand, in Jem brana, it was the R a ja -p u ri which took a strong 
Republican stand, and in Badung the Puri Satria was a center of Republicanism 
even before it was displaced as R a ja -p u ri. In Tabanan and in Karangasem, too, it 
was the Raja who were the first to declare their support for the Republic, although 
they later changed their tune. It does not seem that political status alone— that is 
the status as incumbent or challenger— can fully explain the political positions of 
the different puri.
Nor is it possible to argue that it was only the weakest or the poorest puri 
which supported the Republic, because several of the pro-R epublican puri and jero 
(e.g., Subamia and Kaleran in Tabanan, Pemecutan in Badung, Sukasada in Buleleng) 
were both wealthy and influential. It does, however, appear to be the case that 
weak R a ja -p u ri (incum bents) took up with either the Republican or the Dutch, depend­
ing on which side seemed most powerful locally. In other words, they followed the 
movement of social forces, rather than acting to influence them. Strong R a ja -p u ri, 
on the other hand, took positions in accordance with a prior or principled choice, 
for or against the Republic.
Beyond this distinction, the bases of political choice are difficult to unravel; 
they often reflected sim ply the personal preference of a leading member of the 
fam ily. It is said, for example, that the Raja of Klungkung had an inordinate fear 
that Bali would succumb to Islamic domination in the event of a Republican victory.43 
T h is  fear of Islam colored all of his political decisions. There were, however, some 
broader patterns as well. For example, the better educated Raja and puri members, 
tended to support the Republic. The  Raja of Jem brana, and his son, for instance, 
were among the best educated of the royal families. Th e  Raja of Tabanan, on the 
other hand, was regarded as one of the most poorly educated of Bali’s Raja.44 A  
notable exception to the rule, however, was the Raja of Gianyar (Anak Agung Gde 
Agung), a highly educated man, but at the same time an early opponent o f the 
Republic.45
Th e  pattern or the structure of puri rivalry in each kingdom affected the character 
of political conflict at this tim e, and in later years. There were basically three 
structural types of puri rivalry— dispersed, polarized, and hegemonic— and these were
43. Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 79. The  Dewa Agung’s fear of Islam was mentioned 
repeatedly in interviews with Balinese ex— pemuda, and older civil servants. (Interview: 
I Gusti Bagus Oka, December 18, 1986; I Made W ijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Professor 
J . van Baal, May 1987.)
44. The  Raja of Tabanan completed only four years (of seven) at the HIS (H o l- 
landsch-lnlandsche School, Dutch Native School] in Denpasar. His brothers also 
went without education. According to a Dutch Controleur (Ellerbeck), the puri sim ply 
did not have the money to send the fam ily to school.
45. Anak Agung Gde Agung had studied law in Batavia. Although he now claims 
that he was an ardent nationalist from  the start, his attitude and actions during 
the course of the Revolution have left some room for doubt on this score. He became 
the prime minister of the D utch-inspired N IT , when it was set up in December 
1946. (For A . A . G. Agung’s version of his own nationalist credentials, see his Dari 
Negara Indonesia Tim ur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat (Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 
1986). For a different view, see Rosemary Hilbery, Reminiscences o f a Balinese 
Prince, Southeast Asia Paper No. 14 [Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1979], p. 29.)
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associated with three distinct patterns of political conflict and mobilization. Resistance 
was strongest where both the incumbent (Raja) puri and one or more challenger
puri had some Republican sympathies. This gave the movement a somewhat broader 
base, but, at the same time, gave rise to factionalism within the resistance. This
pattern of dispersed rivalry was found in Badung, Buleleng, and Tabanan. Where 
strong puri divided' for and against the Republic, mobilization was swift and political 
conflict was initially more acute, but the resistance (fid not last long, particularly 
when the Dutch arrived and supported the anti-Republican puri. This pattern of 
polarized puri conflict occurred in Jembrana and West Gianyar. Where there were
no significant puri challengers, the Raja-puri could establish political control and
a clear ideological hegemony. Political mobilization in these kingdoms was sta te - 
initiated, and the resistance to the Dutch was by far the weakest. This hegemonic 
pattern existed in Kkingkung and most of (eastern and central) Gianyar.
The relationship between the structure of puri rivalry and the nature of political
resistance raises a second point of interest; the vulnerability of puri— based political
resistance to the Dutch. Where a single puri was the sole or the primary basis of
political mobilization, the loss of puri leadership (through arrest or a change of 
heart), could mean a sudden end to, or interruption of, the political movement.
This seems to have been the case in Jembrana. Where, on the other hand, there 
were many puri involved on the Republican side, or where there were a variety of 
local bases of political mobilization (e.g., pencak silat gangs, independent military 
organizations, religious groups), the resistance was far more resilient. This was
especially true of Tabanan, but to some extent also of Badung and Buleleng.
These three kingdoms shared certain other features which may have influenced 
the pattern of their puri politics. First, they were, economically, the most prosperous 
kingdoms in Bali. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth, and therefore
the basis for the establishment of new and influential puri and commoner houses—
a rising landed and entrepreneurial elite— were much greater here than in other 
parts of Bali.46 The number of powerful puri meant, quite simply, that there were 
more potential centers of puri political mobilization. Second, these were the most 
"cosmopolitan1 of the kingdoms of Bali which, among other things, meant that new
political ideologies, and models for mobilization— especially those from Java— were 
most accessible here, and that the link with the educated pemuda, as well as the 
older prewar nationalists and intellectuals, was more natural.47 Finally, these were 
kingdoms with weak Raja, from the point of view of both their material wealth, and 
their influence over the populations of their kingdoms.48 The Raja were no longer 
a true landed aristocracy, but declining salaried administrators. Their weakness effec­
tively expanded the area which was beyond the scope of the "center" in each kingdom, 
and created the conditions for the emergence of alternative local state structures, 
either under the leadership of a local puri, or of an independent band of pemuda.
46. A  number of Balinese informants suggested the importance of such a new rising
class in the political development of Tabanan. (Interview: Ida Bagus Wisnem Manuaba, 
an early moderate nationalist leader, member KNI, later PSI leader in Bali, July
10, 1986.) Moreover, social mobility did not only find expression in the creation
of new puri, but also in the expanding wealth of low-caste Tabananers.
47. Wijakusuma suggests that this was an important factor in the greater national/ 
Republican awareness of the Puri Satria in Denpasar. (Interview: I Made Wijkusuma, 
March 23, 1986.)
48. In Badung, this was no longer true after April 1946, when the old Raja (Puri
Satria) was replaced by the more influential head of Puri Pemecutan.
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(b) Issues o f Caste
h needs to be said that the Revolution in Bali was not primarily a movement 
of the lower castes against the higher. The caste character of the Revolution, however, 
did change over time. At the outset, in 1945-1946, men and women of all castes
(Brahmana, Satria, Wesya, and Sudra) were found in roughly equal measure on both 
sides of the political debate. Men of high caste, especially the Satria and the Brah­
mana, figured prominently in the leadership of the earliest nationalist organizations,
including the KNI, and the BKR/TKR.49 They were in a good position to lead because, 
on the one hand, by virtue of their caste, they were thought to possess the "natural* 
ability and right to do so, and, on the other, they often had the requisite material 
resources, and a ready-m ade group of followers upon whom they could rely for 
immediate political and military support.50 There were historical reasons as well 
for the primary leadership role of the triwangsa. Among the most important of
the original BKR commanders were men with prewar military experience in the 
Balinese Prajoda Corps.51 The Prajoda officers had been deliberately selected, by
49. At least 75 percent of Bali’s nationalist activists in October 1945 were men of
the top three castes (triwangsa— Brahmana, Satria, Wesya). The triwangsa represent 
only about 10 percent of the general population. (See "Lijst van Personen," A.S.—
l/XXII/19, ARA Irw. No. 2.10.14.) The first commanders of the BKR in Bali were,
without exception, triwangsa, and a large number of them were of the families of 
the Raja. (See footnote 52, for the list of BKR/TKR commanders in each kingdom
in early 1946.) Even in the pemuda organization, PRI, there was a heavy triwangsa
presence. The vice-head was Cokorda Agung (a Satria) of the Puri Satria; head of 
the defense section was Ida Bagus Tantra (a Brahmana); head of the information
section, Ida Bagus Sadnja (a Brahmana). Finally, on the basis of Republican casualty
statistics, we can estimate that roughly 35 percent of all men with officer rank 
were triwangsa. Among the men of non-officer rank, only about 9 percent were
triwangsa. The positive relationship between rank and caste status is even stronger
among the highest-ranking officers. Statistics compiled on the basis of "Daftar P a la ­
wan Pejuang Kemerdekaan R.I. Daerah Tingkat I Propinsi Bali, Gugur Antara Tahun 
1945 s/d 1950* (Yayasan Kebaktian Proklamasi, Daerah Tingkat I, Propinsi Bali, n.d.).
50. The relationship between a Balinese lord and his followers is perhaps best captured 
by the "patron-client" concept. Under the Dutch regime, the nature of this relationship
was primarily economic and ceremonial, with followers being called upon to contribute 
to the ritual and material projects of the lord {puridiensten). In precolonial times,
however, military service had been a major part of the subject’s obligation to the
lord. (See Mark Hobart, "Orators and Patrons: Tw o Types of Political Leader in
Balinese Village Society," in Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society,
ed. Maurice Block (London: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 65-92.)
51. The Prajoda Corps was a native military auxiliary force, set up by the Dutch
in 1938. It had its equivalents in Java, Madura, and other parts of Indonesia. The
idea was to enlist the support of the local population— in Bali, the high caste and 
high-ranking population— in defense of the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch, however, 
showed little confidence in the Prajoda Corps at the time of the Japanese attack
in 1942. They were summarily disarmed and sent home. Toward the end of the Japanese 
period, a number of Prajoda officers began to meet secretly to discuss and plan
anti-Japanese actions, and formed one of the early focal points for anti-Japanese
and nationalist organization in 1945. (Interview: Meganada, September 18, 1986.)
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the Dutch, from families of high birth. The BKR commanders in Bali, then, were 
veiy likely to be high-caste men.52
It is important to note, however, that the triwangsa did not dominate the leader­
ship positions throughout the Revolution, nor were they equally powerful, even at
the outset, in all parts of Bali. Among the prominent pemuda leaders, for example, 
were a number o f men of low caste including I Made Wijakusuma (leader of the 
PRI and later of the M BU-DPRI (Markas Besar Umum-Dewan Perjuangan Republik 
Indonesia]-Sunda Kecil), I Gede Puger (an anti-Japanese activist, who became leader 
of Pesindo),53 Nyoman Mantik (PRI and later MBU— DPRI-Sunda Kecil), and Nyoman
Pegeg (Leader BKR-Sunda Kecil, later in Intelligence Section of the TKR). While 
their caste "origins did not in any sense disqualify them for leadership roles, it 
was really their education which distinguished them as credible leaders. All were 
well educated by Balinese standards, and three of the four had studied in Java,
which was extremely rare for Balinese of any caste. Indeed education in Java, or
in one of the nationalist Taman Siswa schools in Bali, was an experience shared 
by most of Bali’s young and lower-caste Republican leaders, particularly those who 
were active in the urban—based movements in Denpasar and Singaraja.54
It was through the independent Taman Siswa Schools, established in Bali in 
the m id - and late-193Qs, that Balinese first gained some appreciation of the currents 
of nationalist thinking in Java. Educational opportunities, particularly for those of
low caste, had been severely limited in Bali, and so the new nongovernment schools 
also provided a welcome opportunity for those who could not attend the HIS in
Singaraja or Denpasar, and who could not afford to go to Java for their schooling.
Not every low—caste boy or girl could afford to attend the Taman Siswa (or the 
associated schools, Taman Dewasa and Taman Indah), it is true, but by the late
1930s there were as many as 200 pupils at the Denpasar school, and under the Japanese 
an estimated 600.55 During the revolutionary period, the name was changed to Sara— 
swati School, but it continued to be a center of nationalist sentiment and organiza­
tion.56
52. In March 1946, the TKR Commanders in each kingdom were as follows: Badung, 
I Gusti Putu Wisnu (ex-Prajoda); Buleleng, Dewa Made Swedja (ex-Prajoda officer); 
Jembrana, I Gusti Bagus Kajun (ex-Prajoda officer); Bangli, Anak Agung Anom Muditha 
(ex—Police officer); Giangyar, I Dewa Gde Anom Asta (ex-Prajoda officer); Tabanan,
I Gusti Wayan Debes (ex-Prajoda); Karangasem, Anak Agung Made Karang. The Com­
mander of the TKR Resimen Sunda Kecil was I Gusti Ngurah Rai (ex-Prajoda officer). 
(See L i Kol ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali," March 16, 1946, Archive— Resident
Boon/46.)
53. And was later a leader of the PKI (Bali).
54. The nationalist activists in the town of Denpasar, in October 1945, were almost 
exclusively men of lower caste, or non— Balinese (thirteen of seventeen persons). 
They were primarily educated men, including three medical doctors, at least two 
school teachers, a school head, other members of the urban middle class— a director 
of an export firm, the head of Bank Rakyat— and various government servants. (See 
"Report on the Situation on Bafi and Lombok, Compiled from the Notebooks of the 
republican Propagandist Soekardam," A.S.-1/XXII/19, ARA, liw. No. 2.10.14.)
55. There was no Taman Siswa in the north until 1941 when one was established 
in the district town of Tejakula. (Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986.)
56. Interviews: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October
10, 1986. For a discussion of the Taman Siswa Schools and education in Bali, see
I Gusti Putu Wirata, "Pergerakan Taman Siswa di Bali, Tahun 1933 Sampai Tahun
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The Taman Siswa network forged an important link between the nationalist 
movement on Java and Bali. The central figure in this network was the Javanese 
nationalist, Wiyono Suiyokusumo, who lived and taught in Bali for several years
prior to the Japanese occupation. Balinese graduates of Taman Siswa almost uniformly 
point to Wiyono (or Suryokusumo as he was known in Bali) as the inspiration for 
their later nationalist activism. More concretely, it was through Wiyono that Balinese 
nationalists were brought in touch with men like Sjahrir and Djohan Sjahroezah 
and were encouraged to organize an anti-Japanese underground and then later a 
branch of the PSI.57 Personal friendships and networks developed through other
schools as well. At the HIS in Singaraja, the Balinese teacher Nengah Merta inspired 
a number of the most prominent pemuda leaders.58 In short, the schools, particularly 
high schools, formed an important basis for the development of nationalist conscious­
ness and for the formation of networks of solidarity. For the simple reason that 
these schools were located in the major towns, this consciousness was essentially 
an urban phenomenon. At the same time, the generally greater enthusiasm for education 
among low-caste as opposed to high-caste Balinese, meant that this did not represent 
a shift in the attitudes of the aristocracy, but rather gave expression to the aspira­
tions of a moderately affluent lower caste.
There were non—triwangsa leaders in the countryside as well. Lower-caste leaders 
often emerged in places, or among populations which either had no powerful local 
lord, or where this man was not popular with the people. This was often the case 
in the mountain regions and areas of cash-crop production, and away from the 
older subsistence rice-producing settlements of the south-central region. The periph­
eral regions were frequently occupied by migrants. Ties to a particular lord tended 
to be somewhat looser in these regions, particularly for those who owned their 
own land. Small-holders, producing cash crops such as coffee, cloves, vegetables, 
and fruit, tended to be more dependent upon Chinese traders, money lenders, and 
the market, than upon a local puri or lord.59
1943," Skripsi UNUD, 1971. A  Dutch report from 1946 blames most of the trouble 
in Bali on education. ("Van het studeren van te jonge menschen op Java komt veel
van de ellende," "Rapport Bali* (undated), A.S.— l/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.)
57. Interview: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986. Pegeg made frequent trips
between Bali and Java during the Japanese period, in order to keep in touch with 
the underground. During the Revolution he became a member of the Paras (Partai 
Rakjat Sosialis— Socialist People’s Party), though he never established a Bali branch.
The formation of a Bali branch of the PSI seems to have come only in 1950, with 
the direct assistance of a young PSI activist from Yogya, Bapak Daino. Djohan
Sjahroezah was a founding member of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, and a 
central figure in the anti—Japanese underground in Java. Together with Sjahrir he 
founded the Paras which fused with Amir Sjarifuddin’s Parsi to form the PS (Partai 
Sosialis). On February 12, 1948, Sjahrir and Djohan led the split from the PS and 
established the PSI. (From "In Memoriam Djohan Sjahroezah,” Panitya Setiakawan 
Warga Sosialis Surabaya, 1968.)
58. These included Ida Bagus Indra, Pak Hem and Pak Cilik. (Interviews: Pak Hem, 
September 29, 1986; Pak Cilik (I Nengah Wirta Tamu), December 19, 1986.)
59. Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986. These frontier communHies were
sociologically quHe different from the ancient lowland villages. The story of Dewa 
Made Dhana’s family is instructive. After the defeat of the Raja of Tabanan in 1906, 
marry of his followers fled to the northern frontier of the kingdom. Dhana’s father 
was one of these. Originally from the southern village of Sam—Sam, after 1906 he
fled to the northwest and established a new village (now Bowong Cina) near Pupuan,
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In the more densely populated rice-grow ing regions, it was not uncommon for 
a lord to be unpopular with "h is" people. There were many possible reasons for 
unpopularity, including excessive demands for unremunerated labor on the home or 
public works projects of the lord (puridiensten), or for contributions to ritual/cerem o- 
nial events (heerendiensten), unfair term s of tenancy (where the lord was also land­
lord), and so on. In the absence of a higher state authority, such a lord was more 
vulnerable to challenge. In such situations, influential men and women of the commun­
ity— balian, experts in black and white magic, pencak silat adepts, jago, or others 
with a reputation for *kesaktian*— led the struggle against the old lord, usually in 
the name of " merdeka. ,6° T h is  appears to have been the case for the gangs in 
north-central^ Badung and Tabanan such as "Beruang Hitam " (Black Bear), "Kucing 
Hitam " (Black Cat), and many others besides.60 1
As the Revolution proceeded, the question of caste came increasingly to the 
fore. Men of lower caste became more prominent in the leadership posts and, signifi­
cantly, men of higher caste stopped using their caste titles.62 In the 1920s there 
had been open debate, largely among the urban educated elite in Singaraja, regarding 
the caste system .63 In its broadest outline, this had been a fight between, on the 
one hand, educated Sudra who favored meritocracy, democracy, and modernization, 
and on the other, h igh-caste defenders of existing caste relations. T h is  debate was 
resolved, superficially, through Dutch intervention in favor of the latter group. 
Beneath the surface calm, caste issues remained an important source of political 
conflict. A fter 1945, it was once again prim arily the educated Sudra who tried to 
move the struggle in an anti-feudal direction, and this contributed to a radicalization 
of the Revolution, and to fears of genuine social revolution.
There were, then, essentially three types of Republican leaders, from  the point 
of view of caste. First, there were men of high caste, especially from influential
where he grew padi, vegetables, and coffee. In this frontier region, there were no 
taxes to be paid, and the coastal towns of Buleleng (e.g., Seririt) could only be 
reached on foot or horseback. By the 1930s, however, the area had become more 
accessible and the Dutch system of taxation had penetrated to the most remote 
villages. Not surprisingly, the area became quite anti— Dutch and known as a *daerah 
pergerakan■ well before the war. Here, far from the metropolitan centers of Singaraja 
and Denpasar, an independent Parindra school was established in 1939.
60. Personal communication: Dr. Henk Schulte Nordholt, May 3, 1987. Schulte Nordholt 
suggested that this was the case in the area around Blahkiuh, central Badung.
61. Interview: Putu Mudera (member of the Beruang Hitam ), May 2, 1986. The 
Beruang Hitam was a band of ten or twelve w ell-arm ed men (six pistol— m itrailleur, 
one sten gun, two rifles), which roamed widely about north Badung and Tabanan, 
meting out revolutionary justice to known or suspected traitors.
62. Th e  shift toward low— caste leadership can be seen, for instance, in the changing 
composition of the leadership of the M B U -D P R I, as early as Ju ly 1946. Another 
major shift in this direction came in the aftermath of the devastating battle at 
Marga, in which many of the original leaders of the B K R /TK R  were killed, including 
I Gusti Ngurah Rai.
63. Th e  debate over caste distinctions and privileges emerged within the organization 
Shanti (founded in 1923 in Singaraja). Shanti split in 1924 along caste lines. A  
triwangsa group established the magazine Bali Adnyana, while the Sudra position 
was expressed in the magazine Suryakanta. In 1926 the Tjwadega Hindu Bali was 
established in Klungkung in an effort to avert the spread o f caste conflict from 
north to south Bali.
MAP C FOOD CONSUMPTION AREAS - BALI (1948)
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puri, both urban and rural. They dominated the Republican m ilitary (B K R / TK R ) and 
political (K N I) leadership in the early part of the Revolution. Second, there were 
the urban educated pemuda, largely of lower caste, who were prominent in the 
urban— based political organizations (AM I, PRI, Pesindo). A fter December 1945, under 
pressure from  th e . Japanese, they fled the urban areas, and began mobilization in 
the countryside. Th ird , there were local leaders (n o n -p u ri based) in rural areas, 
who dominated the scene where the state apparatus was weakest.
(c) Relations o f Production— Economic Issues
The main economic themes bearing on the matter of political conflict in 1945- 
1946 can be conveniently summarized as follows: 1) the "plus" and "m inus" regions 
of Bali; 2) landlord-tenant relations; 3) the Japanese economic legacy.
"P lu s" and *M inus" Regions: In the 1940s Bali could be divided roughly into 
regions of relative economic prosperity and surplus (the "plus" regions) and those 
of economic hardship or deficit (the "m inus" regions).64 One standard measure of 
relative prosperity is the availability of desired food staples for local consumption. 
In Bali, the desired staple was (and is) rice. Relatively prosperous regions were 
those in which the population was able to eat rice virtually every day. In less prosper­
ous regions rice had to be mixed with other less desirable staples such as corn, beans, 
and tubers (cassava). According to this measure, the "plus" areas included eastern 
Tabanan, southern Badung, parts of Buleleng, a coastal strip o f Jem brana, and a 
small island of land around the town of Klungkung, while the "m inus" areas included 
most of the eastern kingdoms of Klungkung, Karangasem, Bangli, and Gianyar.65 
(See Map C .) Another measure of prosperity is the availability of a marketable 
surplus. Tabanan produced almost all of Bali’s rice exports (about 15,000 tons per 
year), and, together with Badung and Buleleng, dominated the production of other 
exportable cash crops. A t this level o f generality, then, it would appear that it 
was the relatively prosperous kingdoms of Bali which formed the core area of the 
Republican resistance. Th e  obvious exception, of course, was the town of Klungkung.
There are a number of possible explanations for this pattern, which can only 
be touched upon briefly here. One of these concerns the importance of material 
resources in the sustenance of any political movement or edifice. In the case o f a 
guerrilla movement, such as existed in Bali, food and shelter are prerequisites to 
any action; indeed the search for these is often the prim ary task of a guerrilla 
band. Guerrilla base areas, then, must be located in regions with easy access to 
food surplus. Base areas established in deficit regions place an undue strain on 
the local economy and the local population. Th e  guerrilla resistance in Bali was 
no exception. Th e  same logic applies to other political entities, including states; 
they too require a substantial surplus to survive. Klungkung had such a surplus, 
and judging from the available evidence, much of this was concentrated in the hands 
of the Raja himself.
64. T h is  distinction between "p lus” and "m inus," or "prosperous" \makmut\ and "im pov­
erished" \miskin) regions, is one frequently made by Balinese with some knowledge 
of the island as a whole. It is generally said that the prosperous regions are Tabanan, 
Badung, and Buleleng, while the poor areas are Bangli, Karangasem, and Giangyar. 
Jembrana and Klungkung are said to be somewhere in between [Iu m ay an). (Interviews: 
I Gusti Bagus Oka, December 19, 1986; Hans Harten [Head of the Bali Agricultural 
Office, 1946-1950J, May 18, 1987.)
65. I Gusti Gde Raka, Monografi Pulau Bali (Jakarta: Djawatan Pertanian Rakjat, 
1955), pp. 46 -4 7 .
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A  look at the agricultural la n d -u se  map of Bali (Map D ) reveals that the first 
centers of resistance were located in rich rice-grow ing (sawah) areas where the 
staple food was 100 percent rice: east Tabanan, south-centra l Badung, Buleleng, 
coastal Jem brana. After the arrival of the Dutch, in March 1946, the bases moved 
higher into the mountains, and out of the rich rice-producing lowlands. Yet even 
here, it was necessary to find an area of sufficient surplus. The  first base area of 
the M B U -D P R I (A pril— June, 1946), at Munduk Malang, for instance, though high in 
the mountains, was located amidst high quality sawah, on which were produced 
two crops per year. The same was true of Bengkel Anyar in Tabanan and of the 
various base areas in the north, such as Bebetin, Munduk, and Panji. It was when 
the guerrilla groups were forced to abandon these choice productive areas that 
the resistance began to crumble.
Landlord— tenant Relations: Peasants in the "plus* areas of Bali differed from 
those in the "m inus1 regions in two im portant respects. First, the percentage of 
peasants who owned their own land was greater in the "plus" areas, and the average 
size of land holdings was larger.66 Second, the term s of tenancy for sawah in the 
"plus" regions were significantly more favorable to the tenant, than was the case 
in the "m inus" regions. Map E provides a general picture of the different systems 
of tenancy practiced in Bali at this tim e. The  most favorable system for the tenant 
was nandu, in which the yield was divided 5 0 -5 0  between the landlord and tenant. 
Th is  system predominated in the western kingdoms of Buleleng, Jem brana, Tabanan, 
and Badung. The  systems less advantageous to the tenant were nelon, ngapit, nerapat, 
and melaisin, which prevailed in the eastern part of the island.67 The worst term s 
of tenancy by far were found in Gianyar, one of the strongholds of anti-R epublican­
ism. It would appear, then, that the resistance was strongest not amongst peasants 
who were most deeply exploited, but rather amongst those who were relatively well 
off.
W hile the peasants in the plus areas may have been more vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the market (as was the case in 1931— 1934), they also seem to have 
had somewhat greater economic autonomy or independence from local lords. Support 
for the Revolution in this sector, it may be suggested, was not a defensive reaction 
to greater oppression, but the act of a relatively prosperous and secure peasantry. 
The disadvantageous term s of tenancy in the eastern kingdoms suggest that tenants
66. In 1950, about 85 percent of the land in Bali was privately owned. T h is  privati­
zation of land came about as a consequence of the Dutch land— rent system . The 
level of tenancy on sawah land in Tabanan was the lowest in Bali, with only about 
16 percent farming sawah as tenants. (See I Gusti Gde Raka, Monografi Pulau Bali, 
p. 34.) According to Hoekstra, of those owning land in Tabanan, the average size 
of holding was, for sawah, 0.61 ha, and for d iy  land, 1.08 ha. Overall, this meant 
an average size of land holding of 0.86 ha. which was a significantly higher average 
than in other kingdoms. (See H. J . Hoekstra, "Nota van Toelichtingen betreffende 
het in te stellen Zelfbesturend Landschap Tabanan" (Regeerings commissaris voor 
de Bestuurshervorming in de Groote Oost, 1938).)
67. These term s describe different system s for the division of yield between owner 
and tenant. Under the nelon system the landlord received th re e -fifth s  and the tenant 
tw o -fifth s  of the yield; under ngapit, the division was two— thirds for the landlord, 
o n e -th ird  for the tenant; under merapat, th ree -fourth s for the landlord, on e -fourth  
for the tenant. The  melaisin system required that the tenant pay the landlord an 
amount of money for the privilege of cultivating the land in question. It should 
be noted that the term s of tenancy varied slightly depending on the crop being 
cultivated (e.g., whether padi or palawija). (I Gusti Gde Raka, M onografi Pulau Bali, 
pp. 3 3 -3 4 .)
28
in these areas were in a state of considerable dependency and vulnerability vis—
h—vis the local land—owning aristocracy. This is a condition which would clearly
inhibit acts of resistance or political mobilization, unless these were initiated by
the lord himself.68
Japanese Economic Legacy: The greater productive capacity of the central region 
may have affected the population in a negative way as well. According to Dutch
sources, Japanese extractions of basic foodstuffs and forced labor were greater in
these areas than in other parts of Bali.69 By 1945, Tabanan and Badung, the traditional 
areas of rice surplus, were both suffering shortages. The temporary economic crisis
in these, kingdoms probably brought issues of water control, access to food, and
control of markets and trade, into much sharper focus. Indeed, judging by the nature
of the first acts of violence here in 1945—1946— attacks on Chinese and Chinese- 
controlled markets, water "robbery" and sabotage, general looting— such economic
struggles were among the central issues of the early Revolution in Tabanan, Badung,
and perhaps also Buleleng.
Japanese exploitation, however, did not have the effect of uniting the population 
against the Japanese, because much of the actual work of extraction and policing
was performed by Balinese officials, including village heads, Punggawa, and Mandur 
(foremen).70 The Japanese system of exploitation, then, tended to divide those Balinese 
who suffered, from those who appeared to benefit, from their collaboration. Govern­
ment servants, and employees of Japanese companies, for example, were given extra
allotments of, or special vouchers to purchase, rice, cloth, kerosene, and other
scarce commodities, while producers of these commodities often went without.71
68. Pendit, among others, describes these two regions of the island in terms of 
the strength of "feudalism" in each; in the eastern kingdoms, he writes, feudalism 
was still *tebal* thick or strong.
69. Ellerbeck argues that the concentration of Japanese and Japanophiles was greatest
in Tabanan, because of its greater productive capacity. He also argues that the
earlier development of nationalism in Tabanan had to do with the substantial economic 
opportunities there, which drew entrepreneurs from Java and other parts of the
island. (A. A. W. A. Ellerbeck, "Pohtiek Overzicht Over het Landschap Tabanan," 
September 16, 1946, Archive— Resident Boon/46.)
70. Under the Japanese there were monthly meetings with the Punggawa, who were
given instructions for their districts regarding, for example, the amount of rice
which had to be collected, the number of bamboo poles required by the government 
from each district, the targets for production of export crops like cotton, cloves,
and coffee, the number of men who must be levied to work on roads and public 
works or to go abroad as "voluntary" labor (the Barisan Pekerja Sukarela Bali—  
BPSB), and so on. These instructions were then conveyed to the perbekel and other
officials in each district. The popularity of a Punggawa, not surprisingly, depended 
upon his willingness or ability to resist the excessive demands of the Japanese. 
("Tjatatan dan Pembitjaraan Waktoe Sangkepan Para Poenggawa." This document is 
among papers of the former Raja of Buleleng [deceased), Anak Agung Nyoman Panji
Tisna, which his family kindly made available to me. Hereafter these papers will 
be referred to as Archive— AANP Tisna.)
71. Whereas most families were permitted to purchase only one liter of kerosene 
a month, government servants and *kepala rakyiri? were allowed five liters a month. 
Moreover, Punggawa were asked to prepare estimates of the amount needed in the 
district each month, and this inevitably opened up opportunities for corruption. 
Each family, regardless of size, was allowed an allotment of 1/4 Kg of rice/com
MAP E TENANCY SYSTEMS - BALI (1948)
KLUNGKUNG
1/2-1/2 = Owner 1/2, Tenant 1/2 of crop 
2/3-1/3 = Owner 2/3, Tenant 1/3 of crop 
3/4-1/4 = Owner 3/4, Tenant 1/4 of crop
After Raka, Monografi Pulau Bali.
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Chinese businessmen were exempt from  most of the onerous tax and labor levies 
imposed on the Balinese population, and there were many cases of their having
benefitted economically by a to o -w illin g  collaboration with the Japanese.* 72 Balinese 
officials also took advantage of the Japanese interregnum to accumulate land through 
administrative fiddling. In short, there was cause for a considerable enm ity to develop 
amongst Balinese themselves, between Balinese and Chinese, and to a lesser extent, 
between Balinese and the Japanese state.
(d ) The Japanese Legacy— M ilitary and Political
The importance of Japanese political ideology and m ilitary instruction in the 
emergence of a revolutionary 'pemuda* consciousness, and a new militant political 
style in Java, has been carefully analyzed by Anderson.73 The evidence from Bali
suggests that the Japanese regime had a similar effect on the consciousness of 
Balinese pemuda, and upon the style of Balinese politics.74 75It was in the auxiliary
forces, and to a lesser extent in the village security organizations, set up by the 
Japanese, that the younger generation of Bali received their first m ilitary (especially 
guerrilla) training, an acquaintance with militant p ro -A s ia n  political thinking, and 
the inspiration that freedom might be achieved through violent struggle, even against 
great m ilitary odds.
Bodies such as Peta (Pembela Tanah A ir, Defenders of the Fatherland), Kaigun 
Heiho (land-based Navy auxiliary), Kenpeitei (M ilitary Police), Seinendan (Youth 
Corps), and Bo A i T e i Sing Te i (Pasukan Berani Mati or the Kamikaze Corps), provided 
both an organizational model for later m ilitary organization in Bali, and a good 
part of the ideological foundation for the struggle against all colonial domination,
Japanese included.7* An important component of the anti-Japanese underground
mix per day. Civil servants were allowed to consume 100 percent rice and could 
purchase a guaranteed amount at fixed prices. (See "Tjatatan . . ." (August 1945), 
Archive— A A N P  Tisna.)
72. In Buleleng, for example, a Chinese businessman (Tan  Boen King of Banyuatis) 
reportedly secured tw e n ty-five  horses and twelve wagons (dokar) for next to nothing 
from a Japanese official. (See "Notulen Sangkepan Pangreh Pradja Keradjaan B o e le - 
leng, 2 August 1947," Archive— A A N P  T isn a ) Chinese merchants also received vouchers 
for and extra quotas o f scarce commodities, such as cloth. (See Program s o f the 
Japanese Government in Java and Bali (Honolulu: O SS, Research and Analysis Branch, 
1945), p. 214.) The  Chinese also gained land— ownership rights equal to those of 
■bum iputra■ in Bali. ("Tjatatan . . .* (March 1945), Archive— A A N P  Tisna.)
73. Anderson, Java in a Tim e o f Revolution, pp. 1 6 -34 . Also see Anderson, "Japan, 
The Light of A sia ," Southeast Asia in W orld War II, Four Essays, ed. Josef Silverstein, 
Monograph No. 7 (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1966), pp. 13— 50.
74. It should be pointed out that the development of a pemuda political consciousness 
and political power seems to have been part of a deliberate strategy on the part 
of the Japanese. In Buleleng, as early as March 1943, the Japanese were recommend­
ing that vacant seats in the Paruman Negara be filled with pemuda, and not with 
older traditional elites. (See "Pasal Oendian Anggota Paruman Negara Baru," March 
22, 1943, Archive— A A N P  Tisna.)
75. Th e  formation of the Peta on Bali began in early April 1944. According to Japanese 
reports, the number of applicants in Bali was fifteen tim es the anticipated need. 
The  second wave of recruitment began in Ju ly 1944. By this tim e, the Japanese 
commander in Bali had already been favorably impressed by the "strong fighting
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movement in Bali emerged within the body of these Japanese m ilitary structures in 
1944-1945, particularly within the Peta.76 The  core of the Republican Arm y in Bali 
(the BKR later T K R ) was drawn from  the ranks of the Peta, the Seinendan, and 
the Bo A i Te i Sing T e i.77
In the atmosphere of political uncertainty which prevailed after August 1945, 
the m ilitary skills learned from the Japanese were at a premium. Even older nation­
alists came to regard the organs of civil administration such as the KNI as irrelevant 
to the immediate struggle, and left them to set up the BKR. E x -P e ta  men felt (and 
still feel) strongly that they were uniquely qualified to lead the resistance. In the 
words of a form er Peta captain:
In all honesty, from  the point of view of fighting spirit jsemangat), 
we Peta soldiers were among the best soldiers in the world, while the 
Dutch were not in the same league.78
spirit* and the "ferocity* of the Balinese trainees. A s of August 1, 1945 there were 
1,626 Peta troops on Bali, while in Java there were 35,855. (See Program s o f the 
Japanese Government, pp. 115-16.) The  Kaigun Heiho was set up at roughly the 
same time as the Peta, the first candidates reporting for training on Ju ly 31, 1944. 
("Tjatatan . . .* (August 1944J, Archive— A A N P  Tisna .) The  formation of Seinendan 
units began in November 1943. The  Bo A i Te i Sing Te i (or Bo’ei Tsingtai) was set 
up in March 1945. There were a number of other quasi-m ilita ry bodies established 
in Bali, including a Voluntary Youth Defense Corps, known as Sitbular (s/c). Open 
to both men and women, it involved a 3 0 -d a y period of m ilitary training. It was 
established in A pril 1945. (See Program s o f the Japanese Government, p. 116. For 
more information on the various m ilitary bodies and organizations in Bali, see Explana­
tions Regarding AH Kinds o f Arm ed Bodies [Th e  Headquarters o f the 16th Arm y, 
JavaJ Nishijim a Collection, Materials on the Japanese M ilitary Adm inistration in 
Indonesia, The Institute o f Social Sciences, Waseda University, Tokyo, No. JV .4 5 .)
76. According to some informants, there was a deliberate strategy o f infiltrating 
bodies such as the Seinendan, Peta and, im portantly, the Japanese intelligence organi­
zation, Yama Butai. (Interviews: Wayan Rana, September 21, 1986; I Made W ijakusuma, 
March 22, 1986.) Particularly active in the anti— Japanese underground were men of 
the rank of Cudanco (captain) in the Peta. A  group of some fifteen Cudanco— Peta 
is said to have gathered in the village of Bangsal Gaji on August 16, 1945, for a 
ceremonial raising of the Indonesian flag. (Interview: Bp. Meganada, September 18, 
1986.) The  key figures in the anti— Japanese underground were: Nyoman Pegeg, Made 
W ijakusuma, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu W isnu, Wayan Sambuh, Nyoman Mantik, 
Gde Puger, and Gusti Bagus Sugianyar. (For more details of the origins of the move­
ment, see Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 41— 44.) It should be noted that there was also 
an important civilian anti-Japanese underground which had links with the Sjharir 
underground in Java.
77. The  ex-D aidanco (M ajor— Battalion Commander) of the Peta Bali were the principal 
formateurs of the T K R  Bali, November 1, 1945. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 99.) Th e  
m ilitary men who gathered to plan the April 8, 1946 attack on Denpasar, for example, 
included no fewer than 19 e x -P e ta  officers (1 Cudanco (Captain), 14 Syodanco (Lieu­
tenant)), and a Japanese Lieutenant Colonel (Hera U tji), the form er Vice— Sirei of 
the Navy for Sunda Kecil. (See, I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Kirikum i Besar2an Terhadap 
Kota Denpasar, Serie Gempilan Perjuangan Physic di Bali, No. 1, 1973, p. 7.) Among 
the most prominent ex— Peta officers were I Gusti Bagus Sugianyar, I Gusti Wayan 
Debes and Pak Cilik. (Interview: Pak Cilik (e x -P eta  Captain), December 19, 1986.)
78. I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, Kirikum i Besar2an. A  sim ilar view was expressed by
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In the towns, Japanese schools and sports clubs provided opportunities for, 
and experience in, relatively large-scale mobilization, which became important during 
the Revolution.79 They were also significant as centers of shared * modern* experi­
ence; bases of a collective consciousness and solidarity significantly different from 
those of the fam ily, the banjar, or the religious com m unity.80 In Singaraja, for 
example, one. of the earliest centers o f pemuda activity and radicalism was the 
Japanese high school, Cu Gakko (Tjugako). It was the students of this school who 
were the first followers of Gde Puger.81 In Denpasar, the students and teachers 
of the Cu Gakko organized pro-R epublican mass rallies and meetings as early as 
October 1945. They established the student political organization, ISSM, which later 
formed the core of the PRI membership under Wijakusuma, and carried out extensive 
information and propaganda work in Denpasar and the surrounding villages.
In rural areas, pemuda organizations were established on the basis of existing 
Japanese organizations (e.g. the Seinendan) and clubs, often adopting without adjust­
ment the old lines of command and membership.82 Japanese m ilitary doctrine, with 
its emphasis on the spirit of struggle (semangat), and the importance of kesaktian, 
resonated strongly with indigenous Balinese traditions of self-sacrifice, and the 
spiritual bases of power.83 Indeed, it was under the Japanese that Balinese pencak 
silat underwent a renaissance, resulting in a proliferation of local silat clubs. In 
1945, according to one estimate, there were at least three or four silat adepts in 
almost every banjar in Badung and Tabanan, and in some banjar as many as fifty. 
These were tolerated and even encouraged by the Japanese, and they became important 
bases of pemuda organization and solidarity during the Revolution.84
other e x -P e ta  officers interviewed.
79. Educational opportunities expanded rapidly in Bali under the Japanese. According 
to Japanese sources the number of students attending school in Bali increased from 
25,775 in 1942 to 32,263 in 1943, and then to 49,700 in 1944. O ver the same period, 
the number of schools grew from  238 to 266. (See Program s o f the Japanese Govern­
ment, pp. 296— 97.) There was also a rapid proliferation o f youth clubs and organiza­
tions. The Bali Young Men’s Association, for men aged 12 to 30, was set up in 
Denpasar in November 1943. By February 1944, there was a Bali— wide Federation 
of Young Men’s Associations. (Ibid., p. 114.)
80. The  Japanese also acted to weaken some of these older social bonds. For instance, 
they attempted to do away with obligatory work for religious ends (eerendiensten). 
Th is  was an unpopular move amongst Balinese of the older generation: "W hen the 
Japanese attacked the temple duties, we older people knew they were lost." |"Toen 
de Japanners den eerendiensten aantastten, wisten wij ouderen dat zij verloren 
waren.") (See "Rapport Bali," 1946, A S -l/ X X II/ 1 9 , A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.14.)
81. Gde Puger worked at the Japanese radio station in Singaraja, Hoso Kioku, which 
allowed him to keep abreast of developments in Java. Th e  station was located next 
to the Cu Gakko. (Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986.)
82. Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 145.
83. The spirit of self-sacrifice is central to the tradition of the Satria (w arrior). 
The  clearest manifestation of the spirit is the puputan. (See above n. 16. On the 
spiritual bases of power, see Connor’s work on Balinese *balian.m Linda H. Connor, 
"In Darkness and Light: A  Study of Peasant Intellectuals in Bali" [PhD Dissertation, 
University of Sydney, 1982].)
84. One example of this type of organization was E S S TI, Eka Sentosa Stiti (Kesetiaan 
Tunggal Kepada Dharma, Bangsa, Tanah A ir dan Hyang W idhi Tuhan Yang Maha
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in sum, in addition to the "traditional* bases of social and political organization, 
such as the banjar, the desa, the subak, the religious com m unity, and the attachment 
to a particular lord or puri, there emerged under the Japanese regime, an alternative 
network of organizations, with a new more militant political style, and in many 
cases with a deep, resonance in indigenous Balinese conceptions of power. As in 
Java, these were monopolized by the pemuda, and it was the pemuda who through 
these organizations were able to become the real revolutionary vanguard.
In very broad outline, these were the social-econom ic issues and forces which 
seem to have influenced the outbreak and shaped the character of political conflict 
and political resistance in Bali, 1945— 1946. It is clear that puri rivalry, caste conflict, 
economic struggles between landlord and tenant, and anti— collaborator sentiment 
existed to some extent in every kingdom. Yet there were substantial differences 
within Bali in the way that social— economic conflict was manifested and resolved 
politically. Th is  section has shown, I think, that the political differences between
western and eastern Bali can be understood, in part, as a consequence of the different 
social and economic conditions which prevailed in each region.*5 W e have seen, for 
example, that the western kingdoms shared certain economic and social features 
which were conducive to an earlier and broader political m obilization. In addition,
the discussion of puri rivalries has shown that the structural patterns of puri conflict 
found in the western region were more likely to encourage widespread political conflict 
and large-scale resistance, than those found in the eastern kingdoms.
Taken together, these social-econom ic patterns suggest the existence of two 
rather different social structural configurations in Bali. In the western regions, we
can identify essentially five social groups, the relations between which strongly
influenced patterns of political conflict and resistance. Very briefly, these were: 
(i) an urban administrative/professional middle class, concentrated in Singaraja and 
Denpasar; (ii) an educated, low er-caste urban pemuda group; (iii) a declining, salaried 
aristocracy; (iv ) a rising landed elite; (v ) a reasonably prosperous and independent 
peasantry, with substantial links to urban and export markets. The  moving forces
in the political mobilization and the resistance of 1945-1946 were the pemuda and
the rising landed elite, and they were supported to some extent both by the relatively
prosperous peasantry and by some among the urban middle class.
Th is  configuration or alliance of social forces was quite inconceivable in the 
eastern kingdoms for the simple reason that the class or social structure here was 
not at all the same. T o  summarize: (i) the urban administrative/professional middle 
class was very much smaller; (ii) the educated pemuda group was smaller and isolated 
from the main political currents on Java; (iii) the salaried aristocracy was not so
clearly on the decline; indeed the small aristocracy not only dominated the local 
administrative structures, but continued to be the major land-ow ning  elite; (iv ) 
there was no rising landed or entrepreneurial elite in a position to challenge the 85
Esa), which was established first in Badung, and later spread to Tabanan, Giangyar, 
and Karangasem. The  founder was Made Regog, who worked with the Yama Butai 
(Japanese intelligence organization). The  main activity o f the group was training 
in pencak silat the objective of which was "to  concentrate spiritual energy and 
physical strength." (Interviews: Bp. Meganada, September 18, 1986; Wayan Rana (General 
Secretary of E S S TI], September 21, 1986.)
85. Although Jembrana was similar in most respects to the other western kingdoms, 
open resistance there did not last as long. T h is  was prim arily due to the quick 
and heavy penetration of Dutch forces, and to the effectiveness of Dutch political 
maneuvering in 1946.
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old aristocracy; (v ) the peasantry was less prosperous, and more dependent upon 
the old landed aristocracy. In short, the groups which were central to the political 
mobilization and resistance in the western kingdoms sim ply were not present in 
sufficient force in the east. The  old aristocratic elite continued to dominate the 
scene, and for this reason any political mobilization was from the top down.
As plausible as these social structural arguments may seem, they tell only a 
part of the story. Political organization, participation in political action, fighting 
between villages, the murder of Chinese, guerrilla warfare; these do not spring in 
any sense naturally from a given social and economic situation. They occur within 
a larger political environment, an environment which is shaped very substantially 
by states. For example, rivalries between Balinese puri had always existed, but it 
was only in the absence of a higher political authority, that they became important 
bases of open political mobilization and conflict. It is not possible to draw conclusions 
about the importance of, say, the pemuda, the peasantry, or the Raja, without first 
establishing the political and particularly the state parameters within which they 
were operating. It is to this task that we may now turn.
States— N atbnal and Regional 
The *National" States in Indonesia
The British, Dutch, and Japanese states centered outside Bali, affected Balinese 
politics in this period prim arily by their absence. British and Dutch state authority, 
in particular, extended only in the most marginal way to Bali, and the long delay 
in Dutch reoccupation left a vacuum of "national1 state authority for over six 
months.86 There were, however, isolated events through which these external states 
exercised an interm ittent influence on Balinese politics before March 1946. News 
of clashes between Indonesian and British Indian troops in Java (especially the 
Battle of Surabaya, November 1945), for instance, increased suspicion in Bali regarding 
the m otives of Allied forces, and stimulated the growth of m ilitary organizations 
like the T K R . An unauthorized and provocative landing in Singaraja, by a Dutch 
naval party in October 1945, increased Balinese hostility, and gave the Revolution 
its first Balinese m artyr.87 Perhaps most im portantly, after November 1945, the 
British, concerned by reports of increasing political unrest in Bali yet still unwilling 
to permit a Dutch (K N IL ) reoccupation of the island, urged the Japanese to take 
more aggressive measures to maintain political order there.
Th e  capitulation of the Japanese, on August 14, 1945, of course, was of enormous 
importance in Bali, as it was throughout the Japanese— occupied territories of South­
east Asia. By the term s of the surrender the Japanese were delegated the task of 
maintaining peace and order in these territories, but the knowledge of their defeat 
changed irrevocably the nature of their political authority.88 Th e ir strength, in
86. Th e  Raja of Buleleng described the effect of national state weakness quite 
neatly in his conversation with a missionary in late October 1945. According to 
the missionary, the Raja said that he "was still unprepared to follow the Republican 
movement, but that the situation was getting more difficult because no Dutch or 
English forces were com ing." ("D ata About Bali," December 8, 1945, A S — l/XXII/19, 
A R A , Inv. No. 2.10.14.)
87. The  Balinese pemuda, shot by the Dutch, was I Ketut Merta. For an account 
of the "Abraham  Crijnssen” incident, see Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 87 -94 .
88. See Anderson, Java in a Tim e o f Revolution, particularly ch. 7, "Pemuda in
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Indonesia, lay then almost entirely in their military capacity, and, as Anderson 
has shown, the Japanese military commanders themselves were often disinclined to 
employ force of arms against the mass actions of the Republicans. Some Japanese 
units preferred to hand over arms and other supplies to the pemuda groups, or 
even to fight actively on the side of the Republic.89 In short, the Japanese defeat 
in August 1945 weakened considerably the overarching or national-level state struc­
tures in Indonesia.
The Republican state, centered in Java, extended its influence to Bali in part 
through its delegation of legislative power to the newly established KNIs. Far more 
important, however, was the ideological or symbolic power of the Republic and its 
merdeka message, which passed to Bali by various routes, including radio broadcasts 
(especially those of the Surabaya pemuda leader Bung Tom o), written material, and 
the journeys of individuals between Java and Bali.90 The founders of the main pemuda 
organizations in Bali (Pesindo and PRI) were men with close personal contacts within 
the pemuda organizations of Yogya and Surabaya, and they established the Bali 
branches of their organizations immediately after returning from Java in September 
of 1945.91 On October 1, 1945, word was received by radio in Denpasar and Singaraja 
that the Republic had been recognized by China, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. There was immediate rejoicing, a flurry of mass rallies, and, by the end of 
the week (October 6—8), a mass demonstration in Singaraja demanding that the 
Japanese relinquish political power.
The movement of military materiel and troops from Java to Bali did take place 
in the months prior to the Dutch landing, but this never happened on a very large 
scale. More important than the actual transfer of military capacity, was the symbolic 
recognition, by Java’s Republican military command, of the authority of the main 
Balinese military leaders. Indeed, throughout the revolutionary era, the main signifi­
cance of the central Republican state, for Bali, was not material but symbolic. T o  
an important degree the resistance in Bali moved to the rhythm of the struggle in 
Java.
Arms,* pp. 125-66.
89. In Central Java, for example. General Nakamura began handing arms over to
the Republicans in considerable quantity as early as October 5, 1945. (Ibid., p. 145.)
90. A  speaking tour of Bali by Sukarno in June 1945 also left a deep impression.
In November 1945, representatives of various Republican Ministries, as well as officers 
of the TKR, came on an official mission to Bali. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 98.) In 
October a group of seven Balinese pemuda went to East Java in search of arms 
and information, and made contact with Bung Tom o, and with Republican Navy Head­
quarters. In the second half of December 1945, I Gusti Ngurah Rai led a delegation
to Java, returning in April 1946 with supplies, reinforcements and instructions from 
Army Headquarters in Yogyakarta. For a detailed account of the relationship between
the Navy and Bali’s Republican forces in 1945-1946, see Rochmat Hardjawiganda et 
al., Operasi Lintas Laid Banyuwangi—Bali (n.p., Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan,
Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1982).
91. According to Pendit, Made Wijakusuma, founder of the PRI, had gone to Java
in mid-1944, to establish links with the Javanese anti-Japanese underground. His
main contact in Yogya was the former Taman Siswa teacher and activist, Wiyono
Suryokusumo, who had lived and taught in Bali in the 1930s. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, 
pp. 42-43. Also, interview: Made Wijakususma, March 22, 1986.)
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The "Regional" Japanese State in Bali
The capitulation, of course, affected the authority of the "regional* Japanese 
state, all the more so as Bali lay within the command area of the Japanese Navy, 
which in substantial portions of East Indonesia, had surrendered early on to Australian 
and Dutch troops. In the six month period prior to the Dutch return (March 2, 
1946), regional (B a li-w id e ) state power was divided between the Japanese m ilitary 
and the local Republican civilian bodies.92 They shared, though seldom cooperatively, 
the tasks of state, and, as a consequence, the regional state per se was seriously 
weakened.93 Mr. I Gusti Ketut Puja was appointed Governor of Sunda Kecil by 
Sukarno on August 23, 1945, and the civil administration was officially turned over 
to Puja and the KNI on October 8, 1945. Republican authority was circumscribed 
by Japanese m ilitary power in Bali. Japanese troop strength in early January 1946, 
for example, was reported to be 3,136 men (m ore than three battalions), of which 
1,146 were Navy and 1,990 were Arm y troops.94
Though the Japanese, by virtue of their near monopoly of the coercive apparatus, 
were in a position to put down any major anti-Japanese  uprising they were unable 
to prevent, and perhaps also unwilling to become involved in, the local and d is tric t- 
level political turm oil which characterized this period. Initially, they turned a blind 
eye to the formation of Republican political and m ilitary organizations such as AM I, 
Pesindo, PRI, and the BKR. For a time they took virtually no steps to prevent the 
settling of old scores— against landlords, Balinese government officials, Chinese, 
etc.— at the local level. Moreover, they allowed some arms and supplies to be stolen 
or captured by local pemuda bands, and a handful o f Japanese soldiers actually joined 
the pemuda ranks.95 The  scale of these transfers and desertions was rather small 
when compared to those in Java, and one effect was that the pemuda remained 
seriously short of weapons throughout the revolutionary period. Nonetheless, they
92. Pendit refers to the existence of "tw o governm ents" in Bali at this tim e, the
Japanese and the Republican. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 6 9 -7 0 , 75.)
93. State weakness was not unique to Bali. Indeed it was a condition which prevailed 
for some period of time in most parts of Indonesia after the defeat of the Japanese. 
There were important differences, however, in the duration and the character of 
state weakness, and these in turn affected the strength and nature of the resistance 
in each place. (Kahin, ed., Regional Dynam ics o f the Indonesian Revolution, p. 19. 
Also see Anderson, Java in a Tim e o f Revolution, pp. 1 3 8 -3 9 .) The  long delay in 
the return o f Allied troops (over six m onths), and the weakness o f both the Japanese
and the Republican regimes there, meant that Bali existed in a condition of near
statelessness for an unusually long tim e.
94. For details of troop distribution within Bali, see "Nefis Overzicht Gegevens 
O ver Bali," Archive— Resident Boon/45, p. 6.
95. Evidence to this effect comes prim arily from interviews with pemuda active in
these areas: Bapak Meganada, September 18, 1986; I Made W ijakusuma, March 23, 
1986. Th e  famous pemuda leader, Nyoman Buleleng, was a Japanese army soldier, 
and of the n in e ty -s ix  men who died in the battle at Marga, at least seven were 
Japanese. Pendit reports that the BKR commander from Singaraja (I Made Putu) 
met with the Japanese A rm y Commander in Kediri, regarding a transfer of arms. 
Wijakusuma met with the Japanese "S irei" in Denpasar. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 
96— 97.) According to Meganada, attacks were "staged" with the foreknowledge of 
the Japanese officers at Sempidi and Bela (M engwi), in order to transfer weapons 
without giving the appearance that the Japanese were doing so voluntarily.
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were symptomatic of a certain weakening— in spite of its m ilitary strength— of the 
Japanese state in Bali during this period.96
Early in December 1945, however, there were clear indications of a shift in 
Japanese policy toward the Republic, very likely on orders from  the British. Th e
Japanese presented the Republican administration of Mr. Puja with an ultimatum
demanding, among other things, the return of some 2,000,000 Guilders which had 
earlier been appropriated without fuss by the K N I— SK. In response to this ultimatum 
and to the new Japanese g et-toug h  policy, Republican forces decided to stage a 
simultaneous assault on all Japanese m ilitary installations on the island, on the 
night of December 13, 1945 97 By all accounts, the attack was a dismal failure.
Completely overpowered by the w ell-arm ed Japanese troops, Republican forces were 
forced to flee the major towns.
The Japanese attitude toward the Republicans toughened further after this
attack.98 Whereas in the immediate post-capitulation period they had remained passively 
within their bases, in December 1945 Japanese troops resumed full m ilitary patrols, 
took direct reprisals against the pemuda, and arrested the leaders of the KNI, including 
Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba and Governor Puja. A t the same time they began to encour­
age the Raja to form a political counterweight to the regional Republican adm inistra­
tion. These efforts led to the creation of a Dewan Raja— Raja (Council of Raja) in 
January 1946. If the initial passivity of the Japanese had provided an opportunity 
for Republican political m obilization, the new g et-toug h  policy had the effect of 
forcing the movement out of the towns and into the countryside. December 1945 
then marks the beginning of the rural guerrilla phase of the resistance in Bali. 
Moreover, the arrest of the older Republican leaders at this tim e, meant that the 
Republican movement was now quite firm ly in the hands of the pemuda who had 
fled to the villages.99
The "Regional* Republican State in Bali
The problem of state weakness in Bali was not solved by the early efforts of 
the older Republicans, led by Governor Puja and the K N I,100 to establish a regional
96. For more information on the administrative structure of the Japanese state in 
Bali, see "Bestuur O ver Bali en Lombok tijdens de Japanse Bezetting en DaarnaB 
(undated), Archive— Resident Boon/46.
97. Interviews: I Made W ijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Ida Bagus Tantra (Pak Poleng), 
April 11, 1986.
98. Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 10 1-7 .
99. Th e  TK R -B a d u n g  had been based in the Puri Satriya (Denpasar). They fled first 
to the Puri Kesiman on the outskirts of town, but, still threatened by the Japanese, 
they retreated to the villages of Pegayaman, Bakung, and Carangsari, and from 
there dispersed further to begin information/propaganda work. Carangsari was the 
home of the commander of the Bali T K R , I Gusti Ngurah Rai, who was of puri Carang­
sari. (See Zainabun Harahap, I  Gusti Ngurah Rai, Pahlawan D ari Pulan Dewata (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Sedjarah Hankam, 1968].) W ijakusuma went to  the village of Kelating Sangging 
(Tabanan) at this tim e. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 108— 10, 117.)
100. Bali’s KNI had seventeen members, two representing each of the eight kerajaan, 
and one from the islands of Nusa Penida and Djoengoel Batoe. The  KNI also had a 
W orking Body (Badan Pekerja) of three: I Gusti Bagus Oka, Dr. Angsar, and Ida 
Bagus Putra Manuaba. Manuaba, an older moderate nationalist, was also the Head
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administration. Paradoxically, one of the greatest weaknesses of the B a li-K N I leadership 
was its dependence upon the leaders and organizations based in Java. In the absence 
of clear orders from  Java— a common situation— M r. Puja and the older nationalists 
appeared overly cautious and indecisive at a time when boldness and independent 
thinking were clearly called fo r.101 On the Dutch side as well, Mr. Puja's indecisive 
style drew much criticism . Th e  C O — AM AC AB {Commanding Officer— Allied M ilitary 
Adm inistration Civil Affairs Branch) Bali, J . van Beuge, for instance, complained that 
Puja’s indecisiveness “lends support to passive resistance and boycott campaigns.*102 
In the Dutch analysis, then, the weakness o f the Republican state apparatus in 
Bali was contributing to the condition of political turm oil.
The establishment o f a Republican administration, weak though it was, provided 
an unprecedented opportunity for the growth of other nationalist organizations in 
Bali, and through them the spread of Republican ideas, first in the towns, and later 
in the countryside. Following the model in Java, an effort was made in November 
1945, to  consolidate the various struggle groups into a single fighting and propaganda 
unit, the T K R .103 The TK R  leaders managed to establish a Bali—wide structure and
line of command, but local autonomy of the constituent units was still considerable,
and indiscipline was a serious problem. Moreover, as in Java, there were serious 
differences between the T K R  and the moderate KNI leaders over questions o f strategy 
and tactics. Th e  KNI preferred to have nothing to do with the December assault
on the Japanese, and won the displeasure of the T K R  commanders by refusing to
provide financial support for the action and for the armed resistance in general.104
Another serious weak spot in the Republican state in Bali was that it had no 
independent control over police and m ilitary forces. In late December, the Japanese 
disarmed the Balinese police force (about 511 men, most of them arm ed), and called 
in all sport and hunting weapons.105 Although some o f these policemen joined with
of the KNIP  of Sunda Kecit (o f which Bali was one part). He later became a prominent 
PNI politician in Bali, and a Member of Parliament. Other active K N I members were: 
Nyoman Kajeng, Gusti Gde Raka, Made Mendera, Gusti Ketut Katon, and 1 Made 
Putu. (Ibid., p. 125.)
101. In discussions with the Dutch, D r. Djelantik commented that Mr. Puja could 
not provide general leadership for Bali, but that he {Puja} would be unwilling to 
see the Raja become leaders. (See “Punten uit de mededeelingen van D r. Djelantik* 
(undated), A .S .-1 /X X II/1 9 , A R A , inv. No. 2.10.14.) Many activist Balinese say now 
that they were also im patient with Puja. (Interviews: I Made W ijakusuma, April 3, 
1986; Nyoman Pegeg, Ju ly  31, 1986.)
102. Document No. 313 in Officiate Bescheiden, 3:585.
103. They were assisted in this by two officers sent from  Java, Capt. Subroto A ryo 
Mataram (the son o f a prominent Yogya nationalist) and Capt. Sumarsudi, both of 
the Bagian Penyelidik (M ilitary intelligence) T K R , D iv. IX , Yogyakarta. Subroto 
stayed on as the chief liaison officer for most of the Revolution. (Pendit, Bali Bar— 
juang, pp. 99 -1 0 0 .) Javanese had also been brought to Bali to assist in the Peta 
training in February 1944. Am ong the more prominent were Zulkifli Lubis and Kemal 
Idris. (Interview: Pak Cilik (e x -P e ta  Captain), December 19, 1986.)
104. T h is  issue led to an angry exchange between I Gusti Ngurah Rai and Puja, in 
which Ngurah Rai charged Puja with standing in the way of the resistance. (Archive—  
Resident Boon/46.)
105. According to a British intelligence report (October 1945), many Balinese policemen 
had joined up with the Republican resistance, or at least had failed to act firm ly
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the p&muda, the Republican administration did not thereby gain control of a police 
force. For, as stated earlier, Mr. Puja and his colleagues in no sense controlled
the various pemuda organizations. In October 1945, a British reconnaissance team 
in BaK reported that: *. . . there is no one at the head of the Military Organization 
[in Bali) and therefore any armed resistance will suffer from a lack of coordina­
tion."106 Even when the Sunda-Kecil branch of the TKR was formed, one could not 
speak of any autonomous Republican control over military force. For the large number 
of independent bands, guerrilla units, self-defense {pencak—silat) corps which had
developed so quickly after the capitulation were beyond the control of the TKR,
and the KNJ, and remained that way throughout most of the revolutionary period. 
In March 1946, the estimated strength of the Bali TKR was between 500 and 1,000
men. A  far greater number of people, both men and women, were actively involved 
in independent military and political organizations. In Tabanan, for instance, the
TKR unit under the command of I Gusti Wayan Debes, reportedly had only th irty - 
eight men, but the total number of pemuda activists was estimated by Dutch sources 
to be in the tens of thousands.107
In short, to the extent that Republicanism was a force at all in Bali, it was
not the KNI but the pemuda and student organizations (PRI, Pesindo, ISSM, BPRI,
etc.), together with the TKR, that carried the flame. These local pemuda organizations 
and military units did not contribute much to the strength of thie official Republican
state on Bali under the moderate KNI. Indeed, ideological differences, and lack of 
cooperation within the Republican camp inevitably weakened it. These internal differ­
ences, moreover, were to become important sources of division among Balinese in 
later years, and bases of political party affiliation after the achievement of indepen­
dence in 1949.
Governor Puja, of course, was acutely aware of the frailty of his own government
He also recognized that, though much had changed under the Japanese, the Balinese 
Raja still exerted considerable power and influence within their realms, in some 
cases quite independent of any higher authority. He sought, therefore, to bolster
his administration by gaining their cooperation. The Javanese "propagandist" Soekardani 
employed the metaphor of a horse-drawn carriage to describe the political relationship 
between the Raja, Governor Puja, and the mass of the Balinese people: "The driver
is Mr. Poedja, the horses are the eight Princes [Raja], and the passengers are the 
people."108 Nor was Puja alone in his estimation of the importance of the Raja.
against it. In March 1946, Lt. Col. F. H. ter Meulen reported that the police apparatus 
throughout Bali was in a state of disorganization, while in Tabanan and Buleleng 
"the entire police apparatus has collapsed." (F. H. ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali,"
March 16, 1946, Archive— Resident Boon/46.) Some Dutch reports suggested that the
police had been substantially disarmed even before the December 13 incident. Certainly 
other armed Balinese units, such as the Peta, were deprived of access to weapons 
as eariy as March 1945, in the aftermath of the Peta uprising in BUtar Java. (See 
Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 39.)
106. "Recce Report," 1945, Archive— Resident Boon/45.
107. Ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali" Archive— Resident Boon/46. For Bali as a
whole, in December 1945, the TKR was thought to possess the following weapons: 
5 machine-guns, 2 light machine-guns, 30 rifles, 50 pistols, 3,000 rounds of ammuni­
tion, 100 hand-grenades.
108. "Report on the Situation on Bali and Lambok compiled from the notebooks of
the Republican propagandist Soekardani," AS-l/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 210.14. What 
is curious about this metaphor is that, periiaps unintentionally, the highest orders
June 2d, 1938 Swearing in of the eight Raja as Autonomous Rulers (Zelfbestuurders) at Pura Besakih. Seated 
from left to right are the Raja of: Tabanan, Klungkung,* Baching,* and Bangli;* the Commander of the 
Prajoda Corps; the Raja of Karangasem;* the Resident of Bali and Lombok, H. J. B. Moll; the Head of 
the Department of Outlying Territories, Mr. W. Hoven; the Raja of Gianyar; the Assistant Resident of 
South Bali, B. Cox; and the Raja of: Jembrana* and Buleleng. The Raja whose names appear with an asterisk 
(*) were still in power in 1945. Photograph from Tropisch Nederland 11, 17 (December 12, 1938): 266.
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Many of the pemuda leaders, including those of the lowest caste such as Made 
Wijakusuma, agreed that the Raja must not be antagonized, but where possible culti­
vated as allies. The  Revolution, at least at this early stage was not to be a n ti-R a ja  
(or even anti— feudal) but * pro— merdeka. ** 109
The clearest manifestation of the K N I’s weakness and caution was its decision 
of January 29, 1946, which effectively surrendered political authority to the Raja 
and the "Paruman Agung" the legislative body originally set up by the Dutch in 
1938. Th e  KNI leaders, arrested in the aftermath o f the December 13, 1945, affair, 
were released from  prison on January 21, 1946 on the condition that they acknowledge 
the authority of this body which had been recently reconstituted on the initiative 
of the Japanese.110 Th e  K N I’s "m akloem at," issued on February 9, 1946, read as 
follows:
Considering the status of the island of Bali as a "special territory" of 
the Republic of Indonesia, (and considering) that even "special territories" 
have an obligation to join in establishing a system of government which 
is appropriate to the existing situation, therefore with recognition of 
the promise/willingness of the Rajas of Bali to honor that obligation, 
with this resolution, it has been decided:
T o  surrender the rights and the power which are in the hands of the 
Republic of Indonesia, which according to the 1938 regulations regarding 
the government of the kingdoms (State Gazette, 1938, No. 529) were 
not yet in the hands of the kingdoms, to the Paruman Agung— in its
(the Raja) have taken the role of the beasts of burden, while the common mass of 
the population have become the idle passengers in a form of transportation ordinarily 
reserved for kings and aristocrats.
109. The  decision to seek the support of the Raja was taken at a meeting in D e n - 
pasar between Wijakusuma, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, and I Gusti Ngurah W isnu. T h is  meeting 
took place shortly after a series of heated exchanges between the Raja of Klungkung 
and the pemuda. (Pendit, Bali Berjuang, pp. 79— 81.)
110. Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 126. The  Dutch had set up the original Paruman Agung
on September 30, 1938, as a sort of a ll-B a li "legislative" body. Under the Japanese, 
it had been renamed twice (in August 1942, Poesat Oeroesan Negara2, and in August 
1943, S ju tyo -R en m ei), but had been quite powerless, under the direct control of 
the Japanese minseibu. Th e  reconstituted Paruman Agung of January 1946 was made 
up of two bodies, the "Dewan R adja -R adja" and the "M adjelis Rakjat." Th e  members 
of the form er were the eight Raja, one of whose number was the chairman. The
members of the latter were chosen by the Paruman Negara of each kingdom, and
were tw en ty-n in e  in number. T h is  body was chaired by one of the Raja, who was
assisted in his work by a "Badan Bekerdja" (W orking Body) of five members. Th e
Paruman Negara, the quasi-legislative bodies in each kingdom, were chaired by the 
Raja in each territory. The  members included: all Punggawa, the Sedahan Agung 
and the vice-chairm an of the Raad van Kerta (Council of Judges). O f the remaining 
positions, on e -fourth  were named by the Raja, and th ree -fourth s were drawn from 
designated functional and m inority groups including: "Perbekel," "Bendesa" or "Klian 
desa," "penloerah," "sedahan abian," "pekaseh," Chinese, and Arabs. A  tiny number 
of seats were made available to representatives of the new social and political organi­
zations such as the PRI, BBI, Paruman Pandita Darma, Masyumi, Persatuan Wanita 
Indonesia, and Balische Christenen. Th e  total number of seats in each of the Paruman 
Negara were as follows: Karangasem— 26, Klungkung— 18, Bangli— 18, Giangyar— 26, 
Badung— 28, Tabanan— 26, Buleleng— 27, Jem brana— 19. (See Document No. 313 in 
OfficFSIe Bescheiden, 3:581-82.)
42
new form and new composition— with the stipulation that whatever is 
enacted by that bocN, may not deviate from the Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia.1”
If the act of surrendering power to the Raja was indicative of the weakness 
of the regional Republican state, the legal and political terms of reference of the 
act suggested an important reason for that weakness. While acknowledging the general 
(negative) authority of the Republican Constitution, the decision clearly treated
the Dutch "Zelfbestuursregeling" of 1938 as the relevant regulation regarding political
authority in Bali. Moreover, by turning power over to the Paruman Agung, the KNI 
demonstrated an explicit institutional continuity with the Dutch era, thereby calling 
into question its own raison d'etre and legitimacy.
The granting of formal governmental authority to the Paruman Agung was consis­
tent with Dutch plans for the pacification of Bali,1 12 and it met with the enthusiastic
approval of most of the Raja. The selection procedures were designed to ensure
the dominance of the Raja and other reliable or "moderate" elements. Only a token 
effort was made to include pemuda and other new political and social organizations. 
Yet it was not only the inherent conservatism of the Paruman Agung which was
problematic. More troublesome was the question of whether it could do the job of
running Bali. There were a number of reasons to doubt that it could.
First, the Dutch had not created the Paruman Agung to govern Bali. It had
been set up as a body to discuss, intermittently, a variety of issues of general
(i.e. Bali-wide) interest, such as forestiy, agricultural extension, education, highways,
health, and so on. Secondly, and this is most important, it had been intended to
function under the chairmanship of a Dutch Resident. The central, authoritative
power for Bali as a whole, then, had continued to be the Dutch state.113 In the
absence of an outside executive authority, the Paruman Agung could not be expected 
to function properly. Finaljy, even in its advisory function, the Paruman Agung
had an extremely brief institutional history. The tradition of cooperation among
the Raja was not well established. Executive decisions and initiatives had always
come at the behest of higher authority, first the Dutch and then the Japanese. By
contrast, the chairman of the 1946 Paruman Agung, the Raja of Buleleng, Anak
Agung Nyoman Panji Tisna, had no recognized superior authority over the other
Raja.114
The weakness of the Republican administration of Mr. Puja, after its surrender
of authority to the Paruman Agung, was only too clearly revealed less than two
weeks after the Dutch return. With no opposition, Dutch troops on March 11 arrested
Puja, and other Republican officials, reoccupied the Governor’s residence (the former
Dutch Resident’s house), and raised the Dutch flag above it.115 This action signaled
the end of an important stage in the struggle for regional state power in Bali.
111. The decision was No. 01— 1—20, signed by Mr. Puja and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, 
and issued as a "Maklqemat” on February 9, 1946. Archive— Resident Boon/46.)
112. See, for example, "Nota Herbezetting Bali," Archive— Resident Boon/45.
113. Ibid.
114. The decision to name one of the eight Raja as chair of the Paruman Agung 
was taken Februaiy 4, 1946, by the Paruman Agung itself. ("Peraturan No. 43/1946.")
115. In addition to Governor Puja, the Dutch arrested Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, 
and Head of the Tax Office, I Gusti Nyoman Wiry a. The Dutch action was allegedly 
taken upon orders from the British Commander of the 5th Indian Division (Surabaya), 
General Mansergh. The date, March 11, 1946.
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For over six months Puja’s Republican administration had claimed sovereign 
political authority, but it had "shared" power with the defeated Japanese and finally 
also with the Paruman Agung. The basis of Governor Puja’s power had clearly never 
been as solid as that of the Dutch Residents and the Japanese Minseibu. In part 
this was a problem of poor local organization, of ideological differences with the 
revolutionary pemuda, and a lack of coercive capability, and in part it was a function 
of his adm inistration’s peripheral position within the larger Republican state upon 
which his authority ultimately depended. The weakness of this "regional" state in 
Bali, particularly in view of the near vacuum of "national" state power, created 
opportunities for the extension of political struggle down to the local level. Here 
the Raja and The pemuda quickly moved to the center of the political stage in Bali.
Local States
The reactions of the Raja to the transfer of civilian authority from the Japanese 
to Bali’s Republicans on October 8, 1945 had been mixed. Tw o Raja, Cokorda Ngurah 
Gde of Tabanan and Anak Agung Ngurah Putu of Karangasem, were said to have 
addressed large gatherings (of roughly 5,000 people) and declared themselves "to  
be in support of the Governm ent of the Republic of Indonesia.1116 It soon became 
clear, however, that these declarations sprang from a sense of insecurity in the 
face of Republican mobilization, rather than a strong or principled commitment to 
the Republic. More clearly opposed to the transfer of authority were the Raja of 
Klungkung, Dewa Agung Oka Geg (who refused to allow the Republican flag to fly 
over government offices in his kingdom) and the Raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung 
Gde Agung.16 17 A  brief comparison of the political initiatives of the Raja of Tabanan 
and Klungkung and the condition of state authority in each kingdom, from August 
1945 to March 1946, should provide a sense of the way in which political conflict 
and resistance were conditioned by the character of local states.
116. "N EFIS  Overzicht Gegevens Betreffende Bali", January 2, 1946, Bundel "Bezetting 
Bali," Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis (hereafter, SM G ). Th e  Raja of Buleleng was 
regarded as having pro— Republican sympathies, but he apparently took no public 
position in support of the transfer. He seems to have been concerned to put an 
end to the more violent actions of the pemuda, and hoped that the establishment 
of a moderate Republican administration would do this. In Jembrana the Raja was 
known to have been a moderate nationalist even before the war, but his stance at 
this juncture was not clear. There is a good chance that his position was influenced 
by the opinions of his son Suteja, who was an important pemuda leader. Th e  Raja 
of Bangli was apparently also sympathetic to the Republic, but chose not to express 
this in an open or public forum . The  Raja of Badung did nothing to interfere with 
the growth or actions of pemuda organizations in his area, and appeared to welcome 
the transfer of sovereignty. A  good number of Rajas, then, had some sym pathy 
for the Republic, but most took no public position; their approach was to wait and 
see.
117. Anak Agung Gde Agung had only recently taken over the post from his father, 
Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, who had been dethroned by the Japanese in August 
1943 and exiled to Lombok in October 1943. A t the same tim e as the son became 
prime minister of N IT  in 1946, a brother, Anak Agung Gde Oka, became Raja of 
Giangyar. Details of the Dewa Agung’s political maneuvering in Klungkung at this 
time can be found in a long letter he sent to the Resident of Bali/Lombok in answer 
to anonymous accusations that the Dewa Agung and his militia (B K N ) had employed 
unscrupulous methods in the months prior to the Dutch return. (Archive— Resident 
Boon/46.)
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In Tabanan there was an almost complete breakdown o f normal state power.118 
In the words of the Dutch C O — A M AC AB , Van Beuge:
The Rajah’s government is hopelessly out of gear and has no power 
or perhaps not even the will to preserve order, or to cooperate with 
our troops. It will be our duty to restore law and order with all means 
at our disposal and try to protect the peaceful citizens from  terrorists 
and intimidation. Unless we do this the rot may spread to other districts, 
where at present there is order and peace.
Many of the d istrict-ch iefs and village headmen have lost their form er 
authority and have sim ply given up or are in a completely lethargic 
state, so that the very foundations of the form erly so close ly-kn it 
Balinese society have crumbled and groups of young terrorists are free 
to do as they please.119
The collapse of state power also entailed the decay of essential state structures, 
such as the taxation and judicial systems, and their replacement by alternative 
systems, initiated by Republican pemuda and local bands. Judicial and tax officials 
(e.g., members of the Raad van Kerta, and the Sedahan) were either unwilling or 
unable to perform their duties under these conditions.
In Klungkung, on the other hand, the basic elements of state authority— adm inis­
trative structures, the taxation system, the judicial and coercive apparatus— continued 
to function reasonably well. The  Dewa Agung managed to retain a firm  grip on his 
own officials, people and territory, and Dutch authorities were confident of his 
ability to maintain order and to lim it the chances for Republican mobilization:
The  Raja of Klungkung, Dewa Agung Oka Geg, is at present by far the 
most resolute of the Rajas. He has the situation completely under control, 
and from the outset he has taken a strong stand against the Republic.120
The difference between Tabanan and Klungkung was perhaps most evident in the 
m ilitary sphere. The anti— Republican militia established in Klungkung by the Dewa 
Agung in late 1945 (B K N ) had an estimated 5,000 recruits by January 1946. The 
local B K R /TK R , by contrast, had managed to mobilize only about 100 between August 
and December, 1945.121 By March 1946, Republicanism had the status of an unusually 
weak resistance movement in Klungkung and this did not change substantially through­
out the revolutionary period. The  local state in Klungkung, then, had a near monopoly
118. A  good sense of the chaos which prevailed in Tabanan at this time is provided 
in a detailed political report of the Controleur A . W . A . A . Ellerbeck, "Personalia—  
Tabanan," Archive— Resident Boon/46. Other useful descriptions are found in van 
Beuge, "Report on the Situation in Tabanan," March 12, 1946, M vD, Inv. 3 2 / 1 -G G 8 -D ; 
A . W . A . A . Ellerbeck, "Politiek Overzicht O ver het Landschap Tabanan," Septem­
ber 16, 1946, Archive— Resident Boon/46.
119. Van Beuge, "Report on Situation in Tabanan," March 12, 1946, M vD, Inv. 
3 2 / 1 -G G 8 -D , pp. 1 -2 . In a note appended to this report the commander of the B a li/Lom - 
bok Brigade, Lt Kol ter Meulen, wrote: "In the case of Tabanan I shall change my 
policy if necessary and take strong m ilitary measures unless an improvement in 
the situation occurs."
120. Officieie Bescheiden, 3:589-90.
121. The  Dewa Agung was quite clear in stating that the purpose of the BKN was 
to combat the pernicious influence of the Republic. Actions taken to intimidate, 
torture or kill were seen by him as acceptable if they were directed at these (Repub­
lican) enemies of king and "country." See Archive— Resident Boon/46.
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on the means of force even before the arrival of the Dutch. This distinguished it 
fundamentally from Tabanan, where independent pemuda organizations, the BKR/TKR, 
and guerrilla bands took the military initiative, and the local state lacked any autono­
mous control over military or police forces.
The task of the Dewa Agung of Klungkung was facilitated by a number of factors 
which set his kingdom apart from many of the others, and from Tabanan in particular: 
1) the absence of any serious royal pretender; 2) the historical weakness of the 
prewar nationalist movement and of the administrative middle class in Klungkung;
3) the comparatively small size of the kingdom, and therefore the absence of peripheral
(inaccessible) territories within it; 4) the persistence of "feudal" relations of production 
in the countryside, which implied a greater structural dependence of peasants upon
the landholding aristocracy.
In addition to structural/historical factors, the particular resources and political
skills of the various Raja were of considerable importance in determining the course 
of events within their kingdoms. Land was one important political resource. Raja 
with substantial landed wealth tended also to have large followings, and those with
limited holdings often lacked political and social influence. The Raja of Tabanan
was among the poorest in Bali and he was widely acknowledged as one of the weakest.
In 1942, his puri owned a mere 14 hectares of "very mediocre" sawah and a small 
amount of dry land. The total was not in any way sufficient to support the simplest 
ritual obligations nor even the normal material needs of the puri.122 The Raja of 
Klungkung, on the other hand, reportedly owned veiy substantial tracts of land, 
and he was easily the most powerful and respected of the Raja in Bali.123
The authority of the Raja of Klungkung was also enhanced by the reputation 
he had gained as protector of his people through three years of Japanese rule.
Furthermore, he showed himself to be much more adept than most at using the 
confused legal and political situation of 1945-1946 to his own advantage.124 Before
122. Most of the lands of Puri Gde Tabanan were confiscated by the Dutch in 1906. 
Indeed, the situation was so bad that in 1941 the government bought the puri a 
few hectares of land, and assisted in paying off its accumulated debt. (See A. W. 
A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalia— Tabanan," Archive— Resident Boon/46.)
123. I have been unable to establish any precise figures on the holdings of the
Dewa Agung, but most Dutch sources indicate that they were considerable. (Inter­
view: Prof. J. van Baal [former Assistant—Resident, Bali, 1946-1947], May 9, 1987.) 
One of the main reasons for this seems to have been that in Klungkung the royal 
lands were not confiscated by the Dutch at the beginning of the centuiy. Dutch
civil servants interviewed indicated that they had been well aware of the large 
holdings of some of the Raja and Punggawa, but that they did not make it their
business to investigate these matters too thoroughly. They had also been aware
that these men were in a position to increase the size of their holdings by adminis­
trative juggling, and to this type of behavior the Dutch preferred to turn a blind
eye. During the land-reform  of 1963-1965, the Dewa Agung was said to have been
one of the major landowners, but land— reform officials would not dare to redistribute 
his land. (Interview: Anonymous official at the Kantor Agraria, Bali [land-reform  
section), November 1986.) Supporters of the Dewa Agung today claim that he has 
only modest landed possessions. It may indeed be true that the land which is now
registered in his personal name is minimal, but this is not an adequate measure of 
the land which is effectively under his control— e.g., land which is registered in 
the name of wives, sons, daughters, relatives and other loyal dependents.
124. Pendit, Bali Berjuang, p. 70. In fact the situation was so unclear that Ida
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the Dutch arrived, he had removed ail potential political opponents from office,
and had replaced them with members of his own family or his trusted friends. By
contrast, the Raja of Tabanan lacked both reputation and political skill. At the time 
of his father’s death, in 1939, he had not been named Raja by the Dutch, because
he was deemed too young and inexperienced. Until late 1944, when the Japanese 
finally appointed him Raja, Tabanan was ruled by a Governing Committee of four, 
chaired by the Punggawa Kota. Thus, in 1945, he had scarcely one year of experience
as Raja, and his credibility was seriously compromised by an apparent dependence 
on the Japanese. Moreover, five years of rule by Governing Committee had contributed 
to the weakness of the royal tradition in Tabanan. In March 1946, J. van Beuge
described the abilities of the Raja as follows:
Not much was expected of him, and unfortunately this has proved only
too true. He is a figure of no authority and a weak character, and 
probably lost the little prestige he had in the eyes of his people by
an overservile attitude toward the Japanese.125
He was thus quite unable to exercise control over administrative and political appoint­
ments. A  number of Punggawa, perbekel, and other "state" functionaries were killed, 
kidnapped or otherwise swept from office in Tabanan, under pressure from a powerful 
"revolusi sosial." Others joined the Republican side, thereby weakening still further 
the authority of the Raja and his "state” (see Table B ).126
Had the structures of administration been more clearly defined, the rules more
widely agreed upon, and most importantly had they been enforced by a powerful 
higher state authority, then the personal style and resources of the various Raja 
would likely have been much less important than they were. But the period August 
1945 to March 1946 was, above all, a time of enormous uncertainty and near stateless­
ness. This near vacuum of national and regional state authority exposed the political 
capacities of the various Raja and their local state structures, so that if political 
authority devolved, it did so in different measure from kingdom to kingdom. The 
Dewa Agung’s ability in this respect did not mean that Klungkung completely escaped 
the political turmoil of the post—capitulation period, but it did contribute to a swift 
resolution of open and widespread societal conflict, and the temporary victory of 
anti—Republican forces there. Moreover, it meant that political conflict and violence 
in Klungkung were, by and large, initiated and controlled by state forces, and not 
by autonomous political and military organizations. As a consequence, political rivalry—
Bagus Putra Manuaba (KNI) went to Java to get some answers in September 1945.
Manuaba returned without any further clarification, having been told that the solution
of these problems was up to the government of the province of Sunda Kecil. (Ibid.,
p. 75.)
125. "Report on Situation in Tabanan," MvD, Inv. No. 32/1— G G 8 -D , p. 1.
126. "The Raja is hiding, scared to death, in his puri, and does not dare to go
out. The Punggawa Kota was murdered, the Bendesa fled from the pemudas who wanted 
to kill him. The District and Kingdom offices were closed. In Penebei, everything 
was empty, the Punggawa murdered, his family in refuge, the District office closed
and empty; the village Heads in hiding. In Krambitan the District government had
disappeared, as also in Badjra (District Selemadeg) and Blajoe (District Marga).
The old Punggawa of Kediri died in 1945. His successor stayed in the town of Tabanan. 
The District office of Kediri was closed. Only in Baturiti was there a clerk . . .
who as much as possible, tried to do his work, although he was right in the midst 
of the pemudas and dared not leave his village." ("Politiek Ovemcht," Archive—  
Resident Boon/46.)
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for example between the Punggawa Kota and the Dewa Agung— did not have the 
opportunity to develop into mass—based political struggle, or social revolution.
Table B
Political Orientations of Punggawa and Other Officials 
in Tabanan, 1945-March 1946
Office/Tit|e Puri of Origin Politics
Punggawa Kota, Tabanan Puri Kompiang, Tabanan Loyal/Dutch
Punggawa Marga Puri Marga/Blayu Republican
Punggawa Bajera/Selemadeg Puri Bewa2, Sam2 Republican
Punggawa Krambrtan Puri Pemecutan, Krambrtan Republican
Punggawa Kediri Puri Kediri Republican
Punggawa Penebel (unknown) Loyal/Dutch
Sedahan Agung, Tabanan Jero Beng, Tabanan Republican
Sedahan Pupuan Jero Subamiya, Tabanan Republican
Mantri Politie, Tabanan Jero Subamiya, Tabanan Republican
Source: Compiled from A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalia," Archive— Resident 
Boon/46.
In Tabanan, by contrast, the Raja was unable to establish a firm grip on the
state apparatus in his kingdom, and political violence quickly became open and wide­
spread. It is true, of course, that the social forces contributing to a Republican
resistance were far less formidable in Klungkung than in Tabanan. Nonetheless,
the different long-term  outcomes in these kingdoms had a great deal to do with
the capacity of the Raja to maintain the integrity of the local state in the political
vacuum which followed the Japanese capitulation. The processes of state decay and
political mobilization went hand in hand.
Conclusions
The comparison of Tabanan and Klungkung suggests some general conclusions 
regarding the sources of political conflict and resistance in Bali during this period.
In particular it allows us to articulate more carefully the relationship between state
"weakness” and political conflict. The "weakness" of the local state in Tabanan
had two dimensions. First, the Raja and his puri lacked any autonomous basis of 
political authority. Economically and politically, the Puri Gde had long been a salaried 
dependant of the central state; that is, a functionary of a larger state apparatus,
and not in any sense the center of an autonomous local state. When the larger 
colonial apparatus collapsed, after August 1945, the power of the Raja of Tabanan
collapsed with it. Secondly, the condition of the Raja—puri affected strongly the
other components of the local state, which rested squarely on the executive authority 
and legitimacy of the Raja himself. As his authority deteriorated, so too did the
structures beneath him. In virtually every arena of state activity— administrative,
economic, judicial, coercive— the local state effectively ceased to exist in Tabanan
in this period. In both of these respects, by contrast, Klungkung was manifestly a
"strong" local state.
The deterioration of state power in Tabanan was the primary condition for 
the open political articulation of existing social and economic conflicts and grievances,
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such as those outlined above. The absence of a regulating or hegemonic state, provided 
a unique opportunity for political mobilization and for the expression of new political 
ideas, without the normal constraints. This distinguished Tabanan very clearly from 
the kingdom of Klungkung. The opportunity was only meaningful politically, however, 
to the extent that there were people prepared to take advantage of it, who had 
the means, organizational, economic, and ideological, to do so. In this respect, too, 
Tabanan was unusually well equipped, because in addition to a reasonably strong 
pemuda group and a substantial land—owning peasantry, it also had a large number 
of wealthy puri and ex—government officials, with the resources and the political 
inclination to mobilize on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.
With the decapitation of the local state hierarchy, moreover, the conventional 
line between "the state" and "society" became blurred, and this constituted a second
important condition for the development of a resilient political resistance. Former 
state officials (e.g., Punggawa, Sedahan, Members of the Raad van Kerta) now became 
central leaders of "societal* mobilization under the banner of Republicanism. The 
economic, social, and political resources which had once been harnessed for the 
purposes of the colonial state were now the basis for the emergence of autono­
mous quasi—state structures throughout the kingdom of Tabanan, and much of Badung 
and Buleleng. A  significant segment of the landed elite/ex—officialdom, allied them­
selves with the Republican pemuda, and contributed in this way to the further weaken­
ing of the old local regime. In this respect, the processes of state decay and societal 
mobilization were inseparable, and the more complete the disruption of the old
state structures, the more resilient was the resistance.
Yet the political mobilization of the puri and the pemuda in this period was
not primarily aimed at bringing down the old state, but at establishing new ones. 
These efforts were necessarily scattered, and did not produce a fully articulated 
or unified state apparatus. The political ideals and the political style of the Republic, 
however, did gain wide currency at this time, and this meant that in important
respects the old regime was beyond repair. When Dutch forces landed, they were 
stepping into a society already divided, and already in the throes of a political
struggle over regional and local state power. Under the circumstances, they could
not hope to play the role of neutral guarantors of "rust en orde." Instead, they
became the new, and undoubtedly the most powerful, competitor for state power
in Bali.
